Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1984

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 114. Powell Papers. Lewis F.
Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~

l~frv
1117/Ve.~

v.-;p~
?2 -147Lf

--~

~-~~.A~
/::::;;:/

t-!'

.,

~
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
September 26, 1983 Conference
Summer List 1, Sheet 2
~
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TOWN OF HALLIE, et
Cert to CA7
(Eschbach, Coffey & Wisdom)
v.
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE
1.

SUMMARY:

~nticompetitive

vf

Federal/Civil

Timely

Whether theCA properly held that resp's

conduct was exempt from the Sherman Act under

Parker v. Brown and its progeny.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

to resp City of Eau Claire (City).

Petrs are four towns adjacent
The City has a monopoly on

sewage treatment services in the relevant geographical area, but
not on the collection or transportation of the sewage to the
treatment plant.
services to petrs.

Resp refuses to supply sewage treatment
The City, however, has provided treatment

services to individual landowners in the towns, but only if they
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agree to become annexed by the City and , thereby obtain sewage
collection and transportation services from the City.
Petrs brought suit seeking injunctive relief.

They alleged

that the City's denial of treatment services violated the Sherman
Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and a common law
duty under state law.

The DC (WD Wise., Shabaz) dismissed the

Sherman Act claims ruling that the City's conduct was exempt
under Parker v. Brown, 317

u.s.

341 (1943); the Water Pollution

Control Act claim was dismissed on the grounds that the Act does
not provide a right to sue and that the towns did not exhaust
administrative remedies.

The DC then dismissed the pendent state

claim.
On appeal, petrs contested only the dismissal of the
antitrust claims.

The CA found that under a series of cases,

beginning with Parker v. Brown, supra, and ending with Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455

u.s.

40 (1982), in

order for its activities to be exempt from antitrust liability, a
municipality must be acting pursuant to a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy.

The CA first rejected

petrs' contention that it must find a state policy authorizing
the City to use its monopoly power over sewage treatment to gain
monopolies in collection and transportation.

It is sufficient,

the CA found, if the state gave the City authority to operate in
the area of sewage services and to refuse to provide treatment
services.

If that much was found, then it could be assumed that

the State contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result.

-3The CA then rejected petrs' contention that the state policy
must direct or compel the municipality to engage in the
challenged conduct before Parker immunity can be found.

The CA

held that "any municipality acting pursuant to clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy which
evidences an intent of the legislature to displace competition
with regulation--whether compelled, directed, authorized, or in
the form of a prohibition--is entitled to antitrust immunity
because conduct pursuant to such a policy would constitute state
action."

App. 10.

In the present case, the CA found that

antitrust immunity would attach if there was a clearly
articulated state policy authorizing the City to refuse to
provide sewage treatment to the Towns.
i

"-

The CA then found a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy in several state statutes and state cases
interpreting the statutes.

Wise. Stat. §66.069(2) (c) provides

that a city may fix the area in which to extend sewage services
and that the city has no obligation to serve beyond that area.
Section 144.07(lm) provides that the state dept. of natural
resources may require a city to extend its sewerage system to a
town, but that the order becomes void if the town refuses to
become annexed to the city.

The CA found that the City "acted

pursuant to and in a manner consistent with [state] policy." App.
14.
Next, the CA rejected petrs' contention that the State must
actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct before antitrust
immunity could

attach.

The "active supervision" requirement

-4-

comes from California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980), which involved a statutory scheme
that allowed private parties to establish resale prices.

In City

of Boulder, however, the Court left open the question whether the
active supervision requirement applies to municipalities.

u.s.,

at 51 n.l4.

455

The supervision requirement was necessary in

Midcal to assure that private parties did not abuse the
anticompetitive power given to them.

No supervision is needed

here, however, because the local govt operates pursuant to
expressed restraints imposed by the state in its polcies and
delegation of authority.

The CA held that "if the conduct of

local government in providing municipal services is authorized by
the state and is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy, the activity is state action and entitled to
immunity even though state supervision does not exist."

App. 16.

The CA also found that requiring state supervision would be
unwise.

It would erode the concept of local autonomy and home

rule authority expressed in the state statutes and constitution.
The judgment of the DC was affirmed.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs argue that the CA decision conflicts

with decisions of this Court because it does not require a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy and
does not require active state supervision.

Petrs contend that

the CA found that mere neutrality by the state was sufficient to
meet the policy test and confer antitrust immunity.

Petrs argue

that the CA focused on the wrong service; petrs do not argue that
the City is prohibited from monopolizing sewage treatment, but

-5-

..

rather, that there is no state policy tp displace competition in
the provision of collection and transportation services.
Petrs argue that the active state supervision requirement is
applicable to municipalities under prior decisions of this Court.
There is no distinction between types of "persons" to whom the
antitrust laws apply or the "persons" who should benefit from
state action immunity.

The statutes relied upon by the CA as

expressing state policy contain no restrictions or limitations on
the actions that the City can take.
its own parochial interests.

The City is free to pursue

State supervision is necessary to

guarantee that the anticompetitive conduct is the state's and not
the city's.
Petrs also contend that the decision below conflicts with
Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (CA9 1982).

In

Ronwin, CA9 found that the state policy must address the alleged
restraint, there a grading procedure by which the Bar Committee
passed only a predetermined number of candidates.

It was not

sufficient that the Committee was authorized by the state to
determine who was qualified and who passed the exam.

Thus, in

CA9 a general authorization is not enough to show that the state
contemplated and condoned specific anticompetitive activities.
Resp argues that this case involves the simple question
whether a City can refuse to extend municipal sewer service to
surrounding towns without violating the Sherman Act.

The CA

correctly determined that resp has acted in accordance with and
pursuant to state policy.
~

Under state statutes, the City has a

right to fix the limits of its sewer services: the statute

...

-6-

(§66.09(2) (c)) specifically

contemplate~

and authorizes the

precise action involved here: that a city may determine not to
extend sewer services extraterritorially.
Resp also argues that the CA was correct in finding a state
policy to require annexation before city services are made
available to outlying areas.

Section 144.07(lm) was upheld in

City of Beloit v. Kallas, 76 Wis. 2d 61, 250 N.W. 2d 342 (1977)
where the Wise. s.ct. found that the statute balances two
competing state concerns: providing essential services to areas
outside city limits and encouraging growth and expansion of
cities; annexation requirements provide the correct balance.
Also, in a similar antitrust case under state law, the Wise.
s.ct. found that "the legislature viewed annexation by the city
as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before
extending sewer services to the area." 314 N.W.2d 321, 326
(1982).

Thus, contrary to petrs' claim, state statutes and case

law are not "neutral" as to the activities in which resp engaged.
Resp claims that Ronwin is distinguishable, so there is no
conflict.

There, the CA found that the challenged restraint was

not adopted or directly authorized by the AZ s.ct.

Resp notes

that the Ronwin case was granted (Hoover v. Ronwin, No. 82-1474,
5/16/83).

Resp argues that regardless of what standard of

specificity may emerge from the Ronwin case, the grant of state
authority in this case is sufficient to confer immunity.
Finally, resp repeats the CA's reasoning and argues that the
CA was correct to conclude that the state supervision requirement
does not apply to local government activities.

This holding is

-7-

in accord with Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo,
I

679 F.2d 805 (CAlO 1982), cert denied. 1/10/83 (JUSTICES WHITE &
BLACKMUN would grant) •
4.

DISCUSSION:

The CA's decision on the question whether

there was a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy seems correct.

Nonetheless, there is some question about

how specific the articulation of state policy must be.

Although

Hoover v. Ronwin, No. 82-1474, is distinguishable because it
involves a state agency rather than a municipality, it should
shed some light on the issue.

The primary issue in the present

case is whether the active state supervision requirement should
apply to local governments acting pursuant to state policy.

The

question was left open in City of Boulder as noted by the CA and
is an important one.

At present, I recommend a hold for Hoover

v. Ronwin, No. 82-1474.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

Hold for 82-1474

There is a response.
June 23, 1983
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Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, No 82-1832: Resp has
a monopoly on sewage treatment services in its ge raphical area.
Petrs are 4 towns adjacent to resp that would like to use resp'
sewage treatment facilities. Resp allows individual lando
rs
to use its treatment facilites only if they agree
come
annexed to resp. Petrs sought injunctive reli , arguing inter
alia that resp's policy violated The S
an Act. The DC
dismissed the Sherman Act claim on
ground that resp's conduct
was exempt from liability under th Parker v. ~~~ t! ~~ction
doctrine.
~ ~~~~
On appeal, the
found that re~p was acting pursuant to a ~J~~
clearly articulated and a firma vely expressed state policy of ·~
giving cit1es au or
n
e ar
o sewage service ~
and to refuse to provide treatment services. The CA7 assumed ~
'
from this policy that the State intended to displace competition ~
with regulation. The court rejected petr's contention that the · ~
~
State must •compel• the particular anticompetitive conduct befor ~~- 7
the state action doctrine applies. Relying on Community
~~
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 u.s. 40 (1982) and
~Ai,~~
city of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 u.s. 389 ~ ,~
(1978), the court stated that it did not matter whether the
~
challenged activity was compelled, authorized, or directed, s~~''
long as the State intended to displace competition.
~ ~
The CA7 also rejected petrs' contention that the State must
actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct before antitrust
immunity could attach. Although the Court in California Liquor
Qealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 u.s. 97 (1980), had
required •active state supervision,• that case had involved
private anticompetitive conduct. In Boulder the Court left open ~
the question whether the active supervision requirement applies ~f
to municipalities. The CA7 held that no active supervision of ~ ~
local governments is needed.
'· a.c;.~
This case was held on the premise that Hoover v. Ronwin would ~
shed some light on the amount of clear articulation and active
~
supervision necessary for application of Parker v. Brown
immunity. As written, Hoover does not reach these issues. Thus,
a GVR is not appropriate. The CA7's rejection of a •compulsion•
requirement conflicts with the holding of the CAS in Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., et al. v. United States
(see attached hold memo on No. 82-1922). The cases can be

distinguished on the ground that Southern Motor Carriers involves
the activity of a private association while this case involves
the anticompetitive conduct of a muncipal,ity. This distinction
seems more semantic than substantive, however, because the origin
of the "compulsion" requirement is language in Goldfarb v.
Vir9inia State Bar, 421 u.s. 773 (1975)--a case involving the
act1vities of a state agency. If the Court decides to grant on
the compulsion issue, it shou
a so cons1
CA7's decision
not to require a showing of " ctive state supervis1
" Although
there is no conflict on this issue, 1t 1s
ant question
left open in Boulder.
I will recommend a grant in Southern
Motor Carriers, No. 82-1~2. If it is granted, I would either
grant or hold this case. ~{ It may be best to grant both cases, as
there is a substantial overlap of issues.
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83-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Clair (CA7)
MEMO TO FILE:
This is another case presenting a question as to
the applicability of the "state action" doctrine of Parker
v. Brown.

As in City of Lafayette and City of Boulder, a

municipality is charged with operating a monopoly contrary
to the Sherman Act.
The

parties

Wisconsin

townships

adjacent to respondent, the city of Eau Clair.

The towns

filed this suit for
city's

sewage

are

four

injunctive relief, alleging that the

treatment

facility

-

built

in

part

with

federal funds - is the only such facility available to the
surrounding area.
use

its

agree

sewage

to

be

The city refuses to permit the towns to

treatment

annexed.

facility unless and until they
The

potential competitors of
transportation
foreclosed
them

to

submitted

by

use
on

of

sewage,

towns

claim

sewage

cross

they

are

the city in the collection and
and

that

this

the city's monopolistic
its

that

treatment

summary

granted judgment to the city.

refusal

plant.

judgment

competition

The

motions.

is

to permit
case was
The

DC

The Court of Appeals (CA7)

2.

affirmed, and we granted cert because of the importance of
the case to municipalities in most if not all states.
As

I

view

Wisconsin law.
the

city's

this

Curiously,

and

quotation

These

statutes.

are

its

decision

turns

none of the briefs -

commences

brief

explanation

case,

the

of

set

argument

the

forth

in

respondent's brief, but are rarely -

the

not even

by

relevant

on

a

full

Wisconsin

appendix

to

if ever - quoted in

the brief itself.
In

considering

this case,

we will,

of course,

bear in mind the "rate bureau" case from CAS (as I dictate
this I do not have the name and number of the case before
In

me} •

trucking

that case,

private

industry proposed

rate

bureaus

set up by the

intrastate rates to the state

utility commission that alone had authority to approve the
rates.
by

The

state

rate bureaus were not"specifically authorized

law,

but

had

long

been

accepted.

Here,

in

contrast, no private party or entity is involved.
----------~~-------------

The
Antitrust
government

rate

Division
argued,

bureau
of

the

and

case

was

Department
CAS

agreed,

/

instituted
of

by

Justice.

the
The

that~rivate
"'v

defendant (e.g., a rate bureau} relies on the state action
doctrine, it must prove that its action was "compelled" by

3.

In the rate bureau case the defendants were

state law.
private,
rates

and

although

there

was

state

approval

of

the

The Solicitor General

there was no "compulsion".

has filed an amicus brief in this case arguing that the
state action doctrine does apply where the defendant is a
municipality,
compelled)
SG' s

and

its

action

by the state.

amicus

distinctions

brief
between

is

is

Indeed,
the

private

merely

authorized

the centerpiece of the

emphasis
and

(not

placed

public

on

the

defendants

and

whether the action is authorized rather than compelled.
The two cases we will be hearing this fall are
particularly
consideration
presented
cases
are

interesting
entire

group

of

cases

involve
have

Pc
_.;;.a;...;;;r~k....;e;:...;r"--_v;_•.;___;;B:;..;r=-o=-w~n state act ion questions •

The

viewed

the

they

that

~not

of

because

entirely easy to harmonize.
by

the

SG

as

examples

Bates and Ronwin
of

private

party

defendants whose action was held to be within the Brown
exception because the final action was by a state supreme
court acting for the state. 1

1 1.
The SG does not note that althought tfi e
parties in Ronwin were members of the bar examining
committee it was conceded that they were "officers" of the
state.

.....

Wisconsin Law
It

is

construct

and

62.81(1).

It

ordinance

fix

unincorporate
have

no

case

"viewed

also
the

clear

limits

of

reached

that
such

"the

to

serve

that

the
by

of

and

§66.069(2) (c).
concludes

cities

"systems

is

areas",

together"

conclusion

that

operate

obligation

delineated".
this

clear

are

authorized

sewerage".

Section

"each

may

service

utility

beyond

the

opinion

of

the

and

also

"indiviudally"

Wisconsin

city

[sewerage]

municipal

The

statutes

the Wisconsin

to

~t
1n

shall

area

so

DC

justify

Supreme Court

in

when
the
in a

case brought under state antitrust law.

The case is Town

of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 314

N.w.

2d 321, 325

(1982):
"It seems that the legislature [of Wisconsin]
viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding
unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro guo
that a city could require before extending sewer
service to the area."
In

sum,

it

is

agreed

(conceded)

that

the

"monopoly" exetcised by the town of Hallie with respect to
its sewage treatment facility was authorized by state law.
Active State Supervision

5.

Most
Dealers
test

v.

was

sovereign

Midcal,
adopted

in

u.s.

445

by

a

97,

105

policy

"2- .

an -- the

Retail

Court:

to

a

(1980),

~ "clearly

expres
~
e "

regulation,

California

unanimous

have

must

affirmatively
with

recently

Liquor
two-part

the

state

and

articulated

displace

as

competition

state policy must be

"actively

supervised" by the state itself.
The towns argue that neither prong of this test
is

met.

Their

argument

is

weak

with

respect

to

the

"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" policy.
As

noted

conceded,

above,

Wisconsin

however,

that

law

meets t h'1s

test.

1\

Wisconsin

does

not

It

.
1s

"actively

supervise" what the cities do with respect to extending or
refusing to extend municipal services beyond city limits.
The

an~er

given by CA 7,

and

relied on by respondent and

1\

the SG,

is that Midcal involved private price fixing that

was authorized by the state, but was not supervised by it.
The Court of Appeals
was

not

private

necessary

held that active state supervision

where

parties

traditionally

is

states

a

municipality
the

delegate

defendant.
broad

municipalities to provide local services.
and

numerous

amici

argue,

the

rather

structure

than

Moreover,

authority

to

As respondents
of

state

and

municipal government would have to be altered rna ter ially
if,

to protect

municipalities

from

anti trust

liability,

the state itself must actively supervise whether and when
municipal services are extended beyond the boundaries of
the cities.

Is Authorization Alone Sufficient under Parker v. Brown?
Perhaps
whether,

where

authorization

the

the

of

basic

question

defendant

its

is

a

monopolistic

the Parker v. Brown exception.
perhaps viewed as dicta -

in

this

case

municipality,

conduct,

comes

is

state
within

There is language - though

in both City of Lafayette and

Boulder to the effect that "authorization" is sufficient.
Neither

of

services,

these

though

cases
in City

involved
of

traditional

Lafayette

the

municipal

provision of

public utility service ha ~ been traditional for many years
in a good many municipalities.
in

most

communities

corporations.
collection

and

In

are

any

Yet, the public utilities

provided
event,

disposition

of

it

by

regulated

is

sewage

clear
is

private

that

typically
~

the
a

municipal

- - - - - -service
- - . , fairly comparable to police and fire

protection, the provision of streets, etc.

CA7 summarized

its view with respect to authorization as follows:

7.

"We hold that any municipality acting pursuant \
11
to
clearly
articulated
and
affirmatively '
expressed state policy which evidences an intent
of the legislature to displace competition with
regulation
whether
compelled,
directed,
authorized, or in the form of prohibition - is
entitled to anti trust immunity because conduct
pursuant to such policy would constitute state
action. (J.A. 35-36) ."
The amicus brief on behalf of a number of states
argues

flatly

that

test"

that

recognizes

relationship
only

that

between

the

we

should
the

states

conduct

adopt

of

a

"municipal action

practicalities

and
the

localities,

and

municipality

is

of

the

require
within

a

clearly authorized and expressed state policy.

* * *
I
Boulder.

joined the opinions in City of Lafayette and

In

affected.

those cases private entities were directly

In

Lafayette

the

city

was

competing

with

private enterprise, and in Boulder the city was granting a
monopoly

to

a

private

corporation.

Here,

by contrast,

only public bodies are involved, and the state policy is
far more explicit than in either Lafayette or Boulder.
least

where

the

city

does

not

compete

directly

At
with

private enterprise, and where the activity of the city is
clearly authorized by state law,

I

am inclined to agree

with

CA7

and

This

affirm.

Parker v.

Brown but

different

rule

would

I

would

believe
have

a

be

some

extension of

it would be justified.
drastic

adverse

effect

A
on

state/municipal relations, and also could result in treble
damage

judgments

against

disadvantage of taxpayers.

municipalities

to

the

BENCH MEMORANDUM

Tb:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

November 21, 1984

Lynda

No. 82-1832

Town of Hallie, et al. v. City of Eau Claire

Question Presented

Whether
antitrust

laws

the

state

applies

anticompetitive

actions

the

where

State,

and

action
to

a

exemption

-municipality

authorized--not
are r.._
_ _.......,'-

the

State

has

to

the

whosj e

compelled--by

not engaged

in active

supervision of the anticompetitive municipal function?

2.

I. Background

A. Statutory Background
Wis.
,......-

a city

has

Stat. Ann. §66.069(2) (c) provides that a city

no

obligation

to

serve

beyond

that

area.

It

provides in relevant part as follows:
[E]ach • . . city may by ordinance fix the limits
of such service in unincorporated areas.
Such
ordinance shall delineate the area within which
service will be provided and the municipal utility
shall have no obligation to serve beyond the area
so delineated . . • •
In

addition,

§144.07(lm)

provides

~~

department of
"""
.
natural resources may order a city to extend its sewerage

-

-

the

the

·----- -·
,,
town refuses to

·----~

system to a town, but if that
to

that

-city,

obligation

the

order

becomes void

extend

to

constitutionality of

~·

this

the

and

become annexed

the city has no

sewerage

The

system.

provision was upheld

in City of

Ieloit v. Kallas, 76 Wis.2d 61, 250 N.W.2d 342 (1977).

B. Facts and Decisions Below
Petrs are four Wisconsin townships
adjacent to resp

to build a
available
treatment

(the "City") .

The City used federal funds

sewage treatment facility
in

the

services

area.
to

The
the

( the "Towns")

City

Towns,

that is the

refuses
but

sells

to

only__~

sell

sewag ~.a

them only

individual landowners if they agree to become annexed by
City.

,...-:J!ib,

to ~~

the ~

The Towns filed suit in DC against the City under the

3.

u.s.c.

Sherman Act, 15
a1d alleging,
over

sewage

sewage

inter

§1 et seq., seeking injunctive relief

alia,

treatment

collection

to

the City used

gain

an

unlawful

transportation

and

dismiss~d _ t ~ comEl~ nt

...

that

-._..--

on

the

its monopoly
monopoly

. The ~

services.

ground

that

over

the

City's

conduct was protected state action exempt from the antitrust
laws.

CA7

(Eschbach,

designation])

Coffey,
The

affirmed.

and

court

[CAS,

Wisdom

found

that

by

Wisconsin

I[

"....._

statutes and case law showed that the State had authorized
the City to provide sewage treatment services and to limit
the areas it would serve.
to

assume

~fects

the

State

might result.

contemplated

that

anticompetitive

This was sufficient evidence of state

a:::tion to satisfy the
~trs'

From this, the court was willing

Parker

v.

Brown test.

CA7

rejected

contention that the requirement of California Retail

Uquor Dealers' Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
(1980) ,

that

anticompetitive

the

actively

State

conduct,

Inc., 445

must

be

u.s.

the

supervise

applied

to

97

municipal

action.

C. Relevant Case Law
In Parker v. Brown, 317
held

that

the

prohibition
prohibit

a

on

Goldfarb

v.

Sherman

Act

private

restraints

State

anticompetitive

u.s.

as

intended

sovereign

restraints

Virginia

was

State

as

341 (1943), the Court

on

to

be

a

trade;

it

did

from
an

Bar ,

act
4 21

imposing
of

u. S •

broad
not

certain

government.
773

( 19 7 5) ,

4.

underscored Parker's holding that the applicability of the
state

action

exemption

depends

on

whether

the

challenged

action was a government act by the State as sovereign.

u.s.

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
Court

reaffirmed

the

necessity

In

350, 362 (1977), the

of

the

presence

of

a

sovereign act, and held that the State policy requiring the
anticompeti ti ve
affirmatively

restraint

must

expressed"

and

have

that

been

the

"clearly

restraint

and

must

be

actively supervised by the State.
In City

co.,

435

extended

u.s.
the

-----

that

of Lafayette v.

389,
state

reflect

413

(1978),

action

"state

Louisiana Light

a

plurality of

exemption

policy

to

to actions

displace

regulation or monopoly public service."
that

the

detailed

city need not necessarily
legislative

"an

state

"point to a

mandate

the

Court

of

cities
with

The plurality ruled

authorization before

adequate

Power

competition

specific,

it properly may

assert a Parker defense to an antitrust suit."
Rather,

&

for

!d., at 415.

anticompetitive

activities of cities . • • exists when it is found 'from the
authority

given

a

governmental

entity

to

operate

in

a

particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind
of action complained of.'"

Id.

(quoting the lower court's

opinion, 532 F.2d, at 434).
In

California

Retail

Inc.,

in an opinion by

you~led

system was

445

u.s.

Midcal Aluminum,

----------not

immunized

Liquor

Dealers

Ass'n

v.

97, 105 (1980), the Court,

that California's wine pricing

under

the

state

action doctrine

5.

from the antitrust laws because although there was a clear
legislative

policy

to

permit

price

liquor

resale

maintenance, the State failed to satisfy the second prong of
the

test,

which

required

active

state

~~

k

anticompetitive activity.

supervision of

---..

The State simply authorized price
,.t..·

setting

and

parties;

enforced

it

the

neither

-

prices

established

established

by

the

itself

prices

reviewed the reasonableness of the prices set.
Community

In

u.s.

Boulder, 455
"Home

Rule

40

Communications

nor

Id., at 105.

v.

Co.

City

to ·the

State

of

did ___
not
________

Constitution
_____' -

~--------------_,

the

private

(1982), the Court ruled that a general

Amendment"

constitute

the

.

affirmative

and

articulation

"clear

expression" of a State policy to authorize anticompeti ti ve
conduct
Rather,

that
the

was
Home

required
Rule

by

the

Amendment,

state
in

action

generally

doctrine.
allocating

authority to the municipality to govern local affairs, was
reutral

on

the

policy

regulation of cable

to

be

television;

adopted
hence,

concerning

the

there was no state

action--not even interaction of state and local regulation,
rut only action by the City.
could

not

pass

the

___.....,__. ~

"clear

Id., at 55.
articulation"

-- -

Because the city
test,
-::=.:,

the

Court

expressly refused to rule on whether governmental action by
a

municipality

must

also

satisfy

supervision" requirement set forth
52, n. 14.

the

in Midcal.

"active

state

Id.,

at 51-

6.

I

II. Discussion

~wo

This case presents
must

a

State

government

express

to engage

its

q~t iQ!l S:

policy

requiring

in anticompetitive

how clearly

(1)

a

municipal

activity,

(2)

and

whether such anticompetitive activity by a municipality must
be

"actively

supervised"

by

the

State.

I

believe

reached the correct result on both issues, and I

CA7

recommend

that you vote to affirm.

A. Expression of State Policy
Appellants

argue

that

the

requirement

that

the

State "clearly articulate[] and affirmatively express[]" its
policy to displace competition with anticompetitive conduct
requires

that

"the words or

clearly indicate
the

22.)

displacement

the
of

history of the State statutes

legislature actually had contemplated
(Appellants'

competition."

Brief,

at

This argument is unsupported by the case law and makes

no practical sense.
in City

of

Lafayette

As noted above,
stated

that

a

the plurality opinion
municipality

need

not

point to specific legislative authorization of its activity
to maintain a Parker v. Brown defense.
necessary

is

evidence

that

the

Rather, all that is

State

authorized
435

municipality to operate in the particular area.
at

415.

Such

evidence

is

amply

provided

here

the

u.s.,

by

the

Wisconsin statutes cited above, which directly authorize the
City

to provide

sewage

services

and

to

limit

the

area

in

7.

which

it

will

requirement

provide

that

contemplated

the

the

them.
State

Appellants'
legislature

anticompetitive

request
have

effect

cannot

be

expected,

in

the

course

a

explicitly

embodies

unrealistic view of the way legislatures work.
simply

for

an

Legislatures
of

enacting

a

&atute, to catalogue all of the anticipated effects the new
law might have.
Appellants contend that Wisconsin's position as to
the anticompetitive activity here is strictly neutral, since
the legislature nowhere expressed the view that the sewage
treatment
effect.

m
cr

statutes

would

result

in

an

anticompetitive

The Wisconsin statutes are not analogous, however,

the Home Rule Amendment to the state constitution in City
Boulder, which this Court found to be a neutral statute.

The

Home

Rule

Amendment

was

a

general

allocation

of

authority to the municipality to regulate local affairs: it
did

not

mention

regulation
that

it

was

alleged.
deal

of

the

cable

policy

services
reasonable

be

television.

neutral

as

to

the

adopted
Hence,

vis

this

a

vis

Court

anticompetitive

the
found

activity

The Wisconsin statutes at issue here, in contrast,

specifically with

services,

to

and
and

the

regulation of

expressly authorize
to

limit

argument

can

the
be

treatment

the City to provide the

areas
made

sewage

it

that

will
these

serve.

No

statutes

are

neutral within the meaning of that term set forth in City of
Boulder.

8.

5&-~1-~
The

SG

argues

that

sho~ 1

municipalities

treated differently from private persons for purposes of the
state action exemption because they, unlike private persons,

--

----------

are arms of the State.
need

to

require

municipalities
pursuant

to

to

State

Consequently, there is not the same

that

the

engage

in

policy,

State
the

as

have

"compelled"

anticompetitive

there

is

in

the

the

activity
case of a

private individual seeking the state action exemption.
This argument is eminently sensible.
has "clearly articulated"
have

the

municipality

concomitant

by way of statute
act

in

anticompetitive

a

If the State
its policy to

particular

effects,

area,

with

evidence

of

"compulsion" is unnecessary for a reviewing court to be sure
that the municipality is acting according to State policy.
The

governments,
act

customarily

states

as

delegate

authority

local

to

and the municipality may fairly be assumed to

an arm of

'

the State

-------~-----------

in exercising such authority.

Private persons, on the other hand, may be presumed to act
primarily for

their own interests,

and so,

this Court has

held that "compulsion" by the State compelling their conduct
is necessary before the state action exemption will apply.
See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, supra, 421

u.s.,

at 790-

u.s.

579,

592-593

791;

Cantor

v.

Detroit Edison Co.,

428

(1976) .
Finally,
municipalities
parties

for

the

Court

has

might

be

treated

purposes

of

the

recognized
differently

state

action

before
from

that

private

exemption.

See

~
~

9.

City of Lafayette,
Boulder,
reason

supra,
for

so

supra,

435

u.s.,

at 411 n.

at

51-52

n.

u.s.,

455

holding

here

may

be

14.

40; City of

An additional

provided

by

a

recent

Congressional enactment, the Local Government Antitrust Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544 (Oct. 24, 1984)' which provides
~

attorneys fees may be recovered under"
any action against

a

the Clayton Act

local government.

in

This enactment is
,,.--~-

not relevant to this case, since the appellants asked only
.z::...
·...._____......,...--'~ for injunctive relief, and the Conference Committee's Joint
Explanatory Statement states that Congress intended for the
Buker

v.

Brown

Appellants'
however,

doctrine

to

Reply Brief, App.

that

Congress

continue
4.)

to

apply.

(See

The bill does indicate,

perceives

a

reason

for

treating

private persons and municipalities differently in this area
of the law, and adds support for a decision by this Court so
holding.

B. Active State Supervision
Judge

Wisdom

ruled

that

there

is

no

need

to

the municipality's

require
actions,

in

the

same

way

that

Midcal

suggested

private

parties must be supervised.

This is so for many of the same

reasons

why

offered

above

for

municipalities

should

be

treated differently from private parties for purposes of the
state action exemption.

1--u{

interest on damages, costs or~

that "[n]o damages,

in §4(a)

tYUW

As noted above, the Court expressly

left this issue open in City of Boulder, supra, 455

u.s.,

at

10.

51-52

n.

14,

in

which

it

refused

to

decide

municipality is required to meet this test.
given by Judge Wisdom and

the SG,

I

whether

a

For the reasons

conclude that active

state supervision is not required where municipalities are
involved.

Once there is a clear statement by the State of

its policy to authorize the municipality to engage

in the

activity in question, supervision is unnecessary as a means
of proof that the municipality is carrying out an act of the
sovereign, as it might be in the case of a private person.
Moreover, as Judge Wisdom noted, requiring state supervision
of municipal action endangers local autonomy and home rule
authority,

without

producing

concomitant

a

gain

in

enforceability of the state action doctrine.

Conclusion

This

Court's

~ viote ~
for

purposes

and

of

ffititrust laws.

op1n1ons

have

t milnic ~

the

state

never

be

action

required

treated

that

identically

exemption

from

the

The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette

stated that a legislature need only authorize a municipality
to

act

in

a

particular
prong

articulation"

of

area
the

to

satisfy

the

requiring

test:

"clear
specific

contemplation of anticompetitive effects is not warranted by
the cases and
practice.
action

is contrary to the realities of legislative

Requiring the State to compel the municipality's

and

to

actively

supervise

it

are

likewise

not

11.

mandated

by

the

cases,

and

autonomy for no good reason.
affirm.

would

seriously

erode

local

I therefore recommend that you
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December 21, 1984

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 2, 1985

Re:

82-1832

Town of Hallie, et al v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 2, 1985

Re: 82-1832 -

Town of Hallie, et al.
v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 2, 1985
Re:

No. 82-1832

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

January 2, 1985

Re:

No. 82-1832 - Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
I join.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~nprtmt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUST I CE BYRON R. WHITE

January 2, 1985

Re:

82-1832 -

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~nprtmt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . B RE N N AN , J R .

January 2, 1985

Re: Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
No.82-1832
Dear Lewis,
I must say initially that I am quite happy with your draft
opinion in this case and fully intend to join. You deal
admirably with an evolving body of precedent that has at times
been perceived by commentators as little more than a collection
of results in search of a consistent rationale. But because of
my past involvement with some of our prior decisions in this
area, I hope you will indulge me in making a few comments.
First, I wonder if our holding in City of Lafayette could
not be more precisely described. Lafayette was decided in the
face of opposing arguments that municipalities, as subdivisions
of states, somehow derived total immunity from the federal
antitrust laws "simply by reason of their status" as governmental
entities. 435 u.s.,at 408. We properly rejected that argument,
noting that in our prior decisions involving subsidiary state
governmental bodies rather than the state itself, such as
Goldfarb and Bates, we did not automatically find a state action
exemption. Instead, we consistently had focused on whether the
anticompetitive state policy allegedly being carried out by the
state agency was "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" and whether that policy was "actively supervised" by
the state. Id., at 410. Would not that passing description of
our prior holdings be more accurately described as dictum, rather
than as the "test" or holding of Lafayette as your draft might be
read to suggest at pages 4 and 10? I had thought that the
statement that was actually central to the result in Lafayette is
that appearing at page 413 in the opinion, where we wrote that
"the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged
in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its
subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition
" This is entirely consistent with your discussion and
result in Hallie, and I believe a careful reading of Lafayette
provides more clarity than perhaps subsequent readers have
discerned. The issue of active supervision clearly was not
decided in Lafayette, and consequently was, I think, properly
noted as an open question in Boulder. 455 u.s., at 51 n.l4.
While this is simply a matter of tone, could you find some way to
recast your brief descriptions of Lafayette, since I really do
not think that my plurality opinion there was inconsistent in any
sense with your Hallie?

-

"'

-

Second, simply in the interests of clarity, do you think
that you should note on page 4 that in 'Midcal, (you will recall
that I did not participate in that one), the original action was
one of mandamus with an injunction running against a state
agency, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
and not a private party? The California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association brought the case here on cert as a party intervenor.
Of course, the mere presence of a state agency in the case was
not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from that
appropriate in a private party case. The California Supreme
Court had expressly found that "the state plays no role whatever
in setting the retail [liquor] prices" at issue, 445 U.S., at 100
(quoting 21 Cal. 3d, at 445), and we also stated that "[t]he
State has no direct control over wine prices, and it does not
review the reasonableness of the prices set by wine dealers."
445 U.S., at 100. I suggest a clarifying note only because it
seems to me that these facts may be important in distinguishing
Midcal from this case, as well as from the scheme which we are
about to approve in Southern Motor Carriers.
Third, we held in Boulder that local autonomy and federalism
concerns were insufficient to extend state action immunity to
"horne rule" municipal governance systems. 455 U.S., at 53-54.
Thus, with reference to your footnote 8 on page 11, a state
"tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to
regulate" is no reason in itself to fail to scrutinize municipal
actions under the federal antitrust laws. Also, I wonder if we
should not refrain from commenting on the wisdom of the political
decisions of states vis a vis governance of their local
subdivisions? In sum;-I-wonder if footnote 8 should be deleted?
If not, what would you think of altering the footnote to read
somewhat as follows (changes underlined):
"Once a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy is discerned, further requiring States
actively to supervise municipal conduct might be unwise
as well as unnecessary. [next sentence and citation
unchanged.] To require ongoing supervision by the
State might well erode local autonomy and [omit
possibly] limit the State's ability to focus on more
general matters of statewide concern, to a greater
extent than is required for effective admlnistration of
the federal antitrust laws."
Similar concerns also lead me to ask whether, in the first
sentence of the second full paragraph on page 8, the phrase
"would be unwise" should be replaced with "could lead to
deleterious and unncessary consequences."
Finally, as I stated at Conference, there are at least two
other factors that contribute to my view that municipalities
should be treated differently to some degree from private parties
in the state action area. First, municipalities in many states
must conduct their activities in view of the public eye, under
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"sunshine" laws or their equivalent; even absent such express
laws, municipal conduct invariably is likely to be exposed to
public view and scrutiny. Thus there is less reason to require
ongoing state involvement, since the state will presumably become
aware of deviations from its clearly expressed policies and take
action to correct such deviations.
(Moreover, I presume that if
a deviation from clearly expressed state policy was clear, the
municipality would lose whatever derivative state action
exemption it might otherwise claim.) Second, unlike most
corporate actors, the persons running a municipality are checked
through the local electoral process. While this process does not
entirely assure "pure" motives on the part of municipal actors
(since the electors will in many cases be the same persons who
presumably benefit from parochial anticompetitive policies), I
think the political process is, in general, a more open system
likely to provide some greater degree of protection against
antitrust abuses. These factors, and perhaps others, could be
added to your discussion at pages 9-10 as additional reasons why
"we may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the
municipality acts in the public interest."
As I say, these matters, while not unimportant, are
tangential to the main result which you have skillfully
described.
Sincerely

Justice Powell

.Jttptmu C!fourt of tlrt ~t~ .Statts
._as!rington. ~. (!f. 2llc?~~
CHAM!IERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , ..JR .

January 28, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

No. 82-1832

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Justice Powell requested that I write a memorandum
to you, informing you that he has read Justice Brennan's
letter of January 2, 1985, proposing some changes to the
opinion in this case. Justice Powell views these changes as
consistent with the rationale of the opinion, and proposes
to incorporate them in his draft, provided the Justices who
have already joined the opinion find Justice Brennan's proposals to be acceptable. If this suggestion meets with your
approval, the changes will be incorporated and a revised
draft circulated within a few days.

l~~<:,~

Lynda Guild Simpson
Law Clerk to Justice Powell

jlnpl-tm:t QJourt Df tlrt ~a .itatt•
:¥iu~. ~. QI. 2ll.?'l-"
CHAMI!IERS Of"

January 29, 1985

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
I have no objection to your accommodating the suggestions
made by Bill Brennan.
Sincerely,

~

Justice Powell.
cc: The Conference

.tnvrttttt Q}ltltd qf

tqt 1Juittb ;ibdt.tl'

Jfaglfiugtou,~. (!}.

2llbi~~

CHAMBE R S OF

.J U STIC E SA N D RA D AY O'CO N NOR

January 29, 1985

No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
Attention:

Linda Guild Simpson

Dear Lewis,
I think Bill Brennan's suggestions are generally
quite useful and that they will be helpful if incorporated
in the opinion with one exception. I was in dissent in
Boulder and am uncomfortable with the final underlined
portion of Bill's amendment to footnote 8. Would it be
agreeable to simply put a period after the words "statewide
concern"?
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

<!fomi llf tlt~ ',Jtmu~ .ihtttll
._ztSlthtgbttt. ~. <!f. 2llc?J!.;l

.:iu.pum:~

CHAMBERS OF

January 29, 1985

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
I have no objection to your accommodating the suggestions
made by Bill Brennan.
Sincerely,

~

___.;--

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.iu.prttttt <!}ourt of tlrt 'J!btitt~ .ifahg

'Jiagfringhtn. ~. <!}.

2ll&f~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 30, 1985

Re:

No. 82-1832-Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
I have no objection to your accommodating the suggestions
made by Bill Brennan.
Sincerely,

?./h·
T .M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.:8u:prttnt Qfltttrlaf tlrt 'J'nittb .:§tzdts
.asfrin:gtott. ~. <!J. 2llp~,;l
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

February 1, 1985

Re:

82-1832 - Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
I agree with Sandra's comments in her letter to you
of January 29th.
Sincerely~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

lgs/alb

February 8, 1985
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
Lee & Lynda

From:
Re:

v.

No. 82-1832 - Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
No. 82-1922 - Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.

u.s.

As you requested, we have reviewed both of these
opinions to be sure that each is consistent with the other.

A

new draft of each is attached so that you may read them together.
~

The Southern Motor Carriers draft incorporates most of the

~~:~

changes you requested.

The Town of Hallie draft incorporates not

-~

only changes to conform to Southern Motor Carriers, but also the
proposals advanced by Justice Brennan.

Because we have not yet ~;( ~

received responses from all of the Justices who had previously

~~

voted to join Hallie, the new draft has not been circulated.

~~

We would like to call your attention

specifically~o ~ ~

new footnote 3 in Town of Hallie, which clarifies the

-~

posture of the Midcal case.

procedu~

Justice Brennan had wanted us to add

the note to Hallie to clarify the point that although Midcal had
been brought as a mandamus action seeking an injunction against a
state agency, in fact the case had to be analysed as a case
involving state regulation of private parties.

Justice Brennan

believed, and rightly so, that this distinction is important both
(i) to explain why Midcal is distinguishable from Hallie, and
(ii) to clarify our analysis in Southern Motor Carriers and

J):,d...~ '1
~

141. ~

g

H(

explain why CAS was mistaken in holding that Midcal did not apply
to the rate bureau case.

To this end, we have not incorporated

all of your changes to the Southern Motor Carriers draft, but
have done the best we could to make both Southern Motor Carriers
and Hallie clear in their own right, while consistent with each
other.

We hope you approve.
The other point of note with respect to Hallie is old

fo~tn~ .

Justice Brennan had suggested that it either be

deleted or changed according to language he suggested.

Justice

O'Connor then objected to part of the proposed new language
because of her dissent in City of Boulder.

'x\w:s- . . . . . . . .

agreed with Justice O'Connor.

Justice Rehnquist

We concluded that it might be

easiest to delete footnote 8, since it is far from central to the
t

opinion.

Rory tells us that he believes Justice Brennan would be

just as happy with that course.

If you would like to leave some

remnant of footnote 8 in, however, let us know, and we
glad to try to work some resolution.

will be

Copies of Justice Brennan's

and Justice O'Connor's letters are attached for your information,
as well as the previous draft of Hallie for comparison.
Now that most your comments have been incorporated, the
Southern Motor Carriers opinion is more narrow, and we believe
greatly improved. We did not make a few of the changes that you
suggested, however, and would like to offer a brief explanation
for our failure to do so.

You correctly point out that every

member of the Court has not adopted Justice Stewart's statement
in Cantor that Parker immunity should extend to private parties.
See page 7 of the SMCRC draft.

You suggested that we add a

footnote describing Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Cantor,
in which he states that Parker should be limited to cases in
which a state official is the named defendant.

We believe,

however, that s ~ h :., dis ;.us~~r~ bl ,;_.::us ~ces Brennan
-~

~

and MaLshall. Although they joined Justice Stevens' ill--=
-....
considered opinion in Cantor, they are willing to adopt our

_.... Justice ~evens

position in this case.
are dissenting).

(Only

and

Justice ~ ite

They might find it troubling if their

inconsistency is highlighted in the Court's opinion.

Rory, who

is handling this case for Justice Brennan, has told us that
Justice Brennan is particularly concerned about the seemingly
irreconcilable positions that he has taken in several of the
state-action immunity cases.

If you nevertheless think that we

should discuss briefly Justice Stevens' Cantor opinion, we can do
so easily.

;l/J .

J ~44. ... ~ ~-~ ~~ ••~,

We hope that you will approve of Section IV, B.

•

We

firmly believe that Mississippi's clear intent to displace
competition among motor common carriers is enough to satisfy the
first prong of the Midcal test.

If you think that more than a

intent to displace competition should be required, however,
we think that the case should be remanded with respect to SMCRC's
actions in Mississippi.
You pointed out that for decades common carriers have
been submitting collective rate proposals to the Mississippi
Public Service Commission.

While this probably is true, we are

for two reasons reluctant to assert that the first prong of the
Midcal test has been satisfied by implicit legislative

~
4f~t~

ratification of collective ratemaking.

First, there is nothing

in the record indicating how long common carriers in Mississippi
have engaged in collective ratemaking.

' second, as far as we

know, there has never even been a regulation in Mississippi
approving of this anticompetitive practice.

The state

legislature certainly is less likely to be aware of agency's
policy if that policy is not set forth in regulations.
Therefore, it is difficult to argue in this case that a long
history of collective ratemaking in Mississippi shows that the
practice is authorized by the State as sovereign.

It is worth

noting that even the CAS dissenters were unwilling to state that
Mississippi had a clearly articulated policy in favor of
collective ratemaking.

Furthermore, there is some danger in

suggesting that the actions of private parties, if taken over a
long period of time, are entitled automatically to Parker
immunity.

The Court certainly does not want to establish a

"grandfather clause" in the state action immunity area.
We have eliminated most of the references to "private
parties" in the opinion.

/

We think it is important, however, that

the opinion clearly state that the Midcal test is applicable when
a private party is the defendant.

If the availability of Parker

-

...

immunity is to depend on the nature of the activity rather than

....

.

the identity of the defendant, Midcal's reach must be extended in
this manner.

~
satisfactory.

hope that you will find our "twin opinions"

)

We are, of course, ready to incorporate any

further changes that you may suggest.

/JoN..•~~~..;/-'

~'*~---···.,....,.,.
--[, ·1-'~

,juFmtt Ofourl of tlft ~~ ,jtate.s
:Jifu~ ~. Of. 2!lp~~
CHA M BERS O F

J U S TI CE W M. J . BR E NNAN, JR.

February 13, 1985

No. 82-1832
Town of Hallie, et al.
v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
I join with pleasure your 4th draft
in the above.
Sincerely,
\

r~
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w...

J. BRENNAN, JR.

February 13, 1985

No. 82-1832

Town of Hallie, et al.
v. City of Eau Claire

\

~

Dear Lewis,
I
wonder
if
at
page
5
you
have
unintentionally repeated a line.
At the end of
line 7 you state "we declined to accept City of
Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must
show more
than
a
state policy to displace
competition exists. We . • • . " Should that not
be omitted in light of what you say at the end of
the paragraph, to wit: "we declined to decide
whether governmental action by a municipality must
also
be
actively
supervised
by
the State"?
Whatever you do doesn't affect my full join.
Sincerely,

£;_
Justice Powell

cf tqt 'J!tttittb j;tatts
'lhtsfrittgtcn. ~. QI. 21l.;JJI.~

j)tqtrtm:t <!Jcurt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 19, 1985

Re:

No. 82-1832-Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~·
•

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

lgs March 22, 1985

No. 82-1832

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

This case presents the question whether the City of Eau
Claire, Wisconsin is exempt from the Sherman Act under the state
action doctrine of Parker v. Brown.

For the reasons stated in an

opinion filed with the Clerk today, we hold that it is.

The

decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is
affirmed by a unanimous Court.

lgs March 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Lynda

Re: Cases held for No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire
Attached is a proposed draft of a letter to the
Conference on the cases that were held for Town of Hallie.

As

you will see, 1 recommend that you vote to deny in all of the

--------------------~

cases, as it appears in each one that the Court of Appeals
anticipated (i) the standard we would apply for determining when
a State's policy has been clearly articulated, and (ii) the fact
that we would not require active state supervision where
municipal conduct was involved.
This is the first such letter 1 have prepared for you,
'

so be sure to let me know if it does not conform either to the
form or substance you prefer.

March 25, 1985
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
We held five cases pending our disposition of No. 821832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire.
Gold Cross Ambulance v. Kansas City, et al., No. 83138:

Resp Ambulance Service, Inc.

("AS!") is the only company

allowed by resp Kansas City to provide ambulance services in
Kansas City.
trust.

All of the stock of AS! is owned by a municipal

Petrs are two ambulance companies that are denied access

to most of the Kansas City market.

They sued resps, alleging

violations of the state and federal antitrust laws.

The DC

dismissed the antitrust claims.
CA8 affirmed, ruling that the Sherman Act claims were
barred under Parker v. Brown.

CA8 found that Missouri had

clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state policy
authorizing the City to provide ambulance service to its
residents by means of a single provider.

CA8 rejected petrs'

contention that the State must compel the anticompetitive
conduct, ruling that only contemplation or authorization by the
State was necessary.

CA8 also rejected petrs' contention that

there was no active state supervision, ruling that such
supervision was not necessary where a municipality's
anticompetitive conduct was at issue.
This case was originally held for Hoover v. Ronwin, No.
82-1474, but was relisted and held for Town of Hallie after it
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became clear that Hoover would not decide the compulsion and
state supervision claims where municipal conduct was at issue.
Because CA8 appears to have properly anticipated our decision in
Town of Hallie, I would deny cert in this case.

Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metr.
Area Solid Waste Agency, et al., No. 83-825:

Resp Des Moines and

several neighboring municipalities entered into a cooperative
venture for the collection of waste.

In order to finance a

municipal landfill, the municipalities formed resp Solid Waste
Agency, issued bonds, and agreed to use the landfill as the
exclusive site of solid waste disposal.
landfill.

Petr runs a private

Petr is not allowed to dispose of refuse collected

within resps' area in its landfill.

Petr sued, arguing that the

municipalities' arrangement violated the Sherman Act.

The DC

dismissed the action, and CA8 affirmed.
CA8 ruled that the Iowa legislature had authorized the
challenged municipal activity and had intended that the
municipalities would replace competition with regulation or some
form of monopoly public service.

CA8 also held there was no need

for the municipalities to show active state supervision because
their conduct is in an area of traditional municipal activity.
In so holding, CA8 relied on its decision in Gold Cross Ambulance
(No. 83-138--see above discussion).
This case was originally held for Hoover v. Ronwin, No.
82-1474, but was relisted and held for Town of Hallie after it
became clear that Hoover would not decide the claims presented

-

3 -

here relating to municipal conduct under the state action
doctrine.

Because it appears that CA8 properly anticipated our

decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case.

Scott, et al. v. Sioux City, Iowa, et al., No. 84-360:
Petrs, land developers, bought 89 acres of land along the
southern limits of resp Sioux City in 1962.

In 1966, the City

annexed the land and zoned it for commercial use.

In 1971, the

City received federal funds to assist it in an urban renewal
project that had been in the works for nearly seven years.
Pursuant to the Iowa Urban Renewal Law, the City planned to
acquire and redevelop its run-down central business district.

In

1974, petrs announced plans to develop a regional shopping center
onJ part of its land on the outskirts of town.

Fearing that the

shopping center would hinder its downtown renewal project, resps
the City Council passed an ordinance barring construction of the
shopping center.

Petrs sued, alleging violations of the Sherman

Act and a claim for damages under §1983.

The DC granted summary

judgment for the City, relying on CA8's opinion in Gold Cross
Ambulance (No. 83-138--see above discussion).
CA8 affirmed.

It ruled that the Iowa Urban Renewal Law

specifically authorized the City to zone petrs' land in a way
that would help effectuate its urban renewal goals, and also
authorized the City to do "any and all things necessary" to carry
out those goals.

Moreover, the statute authorized the City's

cooperative relationship with the private developer it had chosen
to help it with the project.

These statutory provisions showed

- 4 -
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that the legislature had contemplated the selective zoning at
issue here.

CAB also ruled that active state supervision was

unnecessary.
Because CAB appears to have correctly anticipated our
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case.

Golden State Transit Corp v. City of Los Angeles, No.
B4-37B:

Petr operated a taxicab company in resp City.

Taxicab

operators must have a franchise granted by the City, and the City
Council makes the ultimate decision on whether to grant an
application.

In 19BO, all of the franchises expired and all

holders, including petr, applied for renewal.

The City Council

denied petr's application.
Petr sued, alleging that the City had violated the
Sherman Act and various provisions of the federal Constitution.
The DC granted the City partial summary judgment on the antitrust
claim under Parker v. Brown.

CA9 affirmed.

It ruled that the

City was required to show a state policy to displace competition
with regulation and to show that the legislature contemplated the
kind of action alleged to be anticompetitive.

It found those

requirements to be met by the Passenger Charter-Party Carriers'
Act.

CA9 also ruled that the City need not show active

supervision by the State.
Because CA9 appears to have correctly anticipated our
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case.
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Hybud Equipment Corp., et al. v. City of Akron, Ohio,
et al., No. 84-832:

Petrs are private firms that have for years

competed in the waste disposal and recycling business in resp
City and surrounding areas.

In 1976, the City decided to build

its own facility to recycle waste.

An Ohio state agency, the

Ohio water Development Authority ("OWDA"), issued revenue bonds
to finance the project.

An ordinance was enacted requiring all

solid waste collected within city limits to be transported to the
city facility and requiring a "tipping fee," to be set by the
City, to be paid to the facility for accepting the waste.

Petrs

sued, arguing that the ordinance and related measures violated
the Sherman Act and various provisions of the federal
Constitution.

The DC ruled for resps, holding that on the

antitrust claims, resps' actions were exempt from liability under
Parker v. Brown.
CA6 affirmed, concluding that the statutes governing
the OWDA issued a specific mandate to implement "the public
policy of the State • • • to provide • • • efficient and proper
methods of disposal, salvage, and reuse or recovery of resources
from solid waste

"

In so holding, CA6 noted that the City

was not required to point to a "specific, detailed legislative
authorization,"

(quoting City of Lafayette), but that there must

be evidence that the State authorized the municipality to act as
it did and contemplated the kind of action that is alleged to be
anticompetitive.
Because CA6 properly anticipated our decision in Town
of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case.

82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
LFP for the Court 12/10/84
1st draft 12/20/84
2nd draft 12/28/84
3rd draft 1/7/85
4th draft 2/12/85
Joined by HAB 12/21/84
soc 1/2/85
WHR 1/2/85
JPS 1/2/85
BRW l/2/85
CJ 1/2/85
WJB 2/13/85
2/19/85
Two copies to Mr. Lind 1/2/85
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 2, 1985

Re:

82-1832

Town of Hallie, et al v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 2, 1985

Re: 82-1832 -

Town of Hallie, et al.
v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.Ju.prmu <!fqurl qf tlft 'Jttittb .Jta.tts
._asftinghttt. ~. <!f. 2ll&fJ1$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 2, 1985
Re:

No. 82-1832

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

January 2, 1985

Re:

No. 82-1832 - Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
I join.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUST I CE BYRON R. WHITE

January 2, 1985

Re:

82-1832 -

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . B RE N N AN , J R .

January 2, 1985

Re: Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
No.82-1832
Dear Lewis,
I must say initially that I am quite happy with your draft
opinion in this case and fully intend to join. You deal
admirably with an evolving body of precedent that has at times
been perceived by commentators as little more than a collection
of results in search of a consistent rationale. But because of
my past involvement with some of our prior decisions in this
area, I hope you will indulge me in making a few comments.
First, I wonder if our holding in City of Lafayette could
not be more precisely described. Lafayette was decided in the
face of opposing arguments that municipalities, as subdivisions
of states, somehow derived total immunity from the federal
antitrust laws "simply by reason of their status" as governmental
entities. 435 u.s.,at 408. We properly rejected that argument,
noting that in our prior decisions involving subsidiary state
governmental bodies rather than the state itself, such as
Goldfarb and Bates, we did not automatically find a state action
exemption. Instead, we consistently had focused on whether the
anticompetitive state policy allegedly being carried out by the
state agency was "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" and whether that policy was "actively supervised" by
the state. Id., at 410. Would not that passing description of
our prior holdings be more accurately described as dictum, rather
than as the "test" or holding of Lafayette as your draft might be
read to suggest at pages 4 and 10? I had thought that the
statement that was actually central to the result in Lafayette is
that appearing at page 413 in the opinion, where we wrote that
"the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged
in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its
subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition
" This is entirely consistent with your discussion and
result in Hallie, and I believe a careful reading of Lafayette
provides more clarity than perhaps subsequent readers have
discerned. The issue of active supervision clearly was not
decided in Lafayette, and consequently was, I think, properly
noted as an open question in Boulder. 455 u.s., at 51 n.l4.
While this is simply a matter of tone, could you find some way to
recast your brief descriptions of Lafayette, since I really do
not think that my plurality opinion there was inconsistent in any
sense with your Hallie?

-

"'

-

Second, simply in the interests of clarity, do you think
that you should note on page 4 that in 'Midcal, (you will recall
that I did not participate in that one), the original action was
one of mandamus with an injunction running against a state
agency, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
and not a private party? The California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association brought the case here on cert as a party intervenor.
Of course, the mere presence of a state agency in the case was
not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from that
appropriate in a private party case. The California Supreme
Court had expressly found that "the state plays no role whatever
in setting the retail [liquor] prices" at issue, 445 U.S., at 100
(quoting 21 Cal. 3d, at 445), and we also stated that "[t]he
State has no direct control over wine prices, and it does not
review the reasonableness of the prices set by wine dealers."
445 U.S., at 100. I suggest a clarifying note only because it
seems to me that these facts may be important in distinguishing
Midcal from this case, as well as from the scheme which we are
about to approve in Southern Motor Carriers.
Third, we held in Boulder that local autonomy and federalism
concerns were insufficient to extend state action immunity to
"horne rule" municipal governance systems. 455 U.S., at 53-54.
Thus, with reference to your footnote 8 on page 11, a state
"tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to
regulate" is no reason in itself to fail to scrutinize municipal
actions under the federal antitrust laws. Also, I wonder if we
should not refrain from commenting on the wisdom of the political
decisions of states vis a vis governance of their local
subdivisions? In sum;-I-wonder if footnote 8 should be deleted?
If not, what would you think of altering the footnote to read
somewhat as follows (changes underlined):
"Once a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy is discerned, further requiring States
actively to supervise municipal conduct might be unwise
as well as unnecessary. [next sentence and citation
unchanged.] To require ongoing supervision by the
State might well erode local autonomy and [omit
possibly] limit the State's ability to focus on more
general matters of statewide concern, to a greater
extent than is required for effective admlnistration of
the federal antitrust laws."
Similar concerns also lead me to ask whether, in the first
sentence of the second full paragraph on page 8, the phrase
"would be unwise" should be replaced with "could lead to
deleterious and unncessary consequences."
Finally, as I stated at Conference, there are at least two
other factors that contribute to my view that municipalities
should be treated differently to some degree from private parties
in the state action area. First, municipalities in many states
must conduct their activities in view of the public eye, under
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"sunshine" laws or their equivalent; even absent such express
laws, municipal conduct invariably is likely to be exposed to
public view and scrutiny. Thus there is less reason to require
ongoing state involvement, since the state will presumably become
aware of deviations from its clearly expressed policies and take
action to correct such deviations.
(Moreover, I presume that if
a deviation from clearly expressed state policy was clear, the
municipality would lose whatever derivative state action
exemption it might otherwise claim.) Second, unlike most
corporate actors, the persons running a municipality are checked
through the local electoral process. While this process does not
entirely assure "pure" motives on the part of municipal actors
(since the electors will in many cases be the same persons who
presumably benefit from parochial anticompetitive policies), I
think the political process is, in general, a more open system
likely to provide some greater degree of protection against
antitrust abuses. These factors, and perhaps others, could be
added to your discussion at pages 9-10 as additional reasons why
"we may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the
municipality acts in the public interest."
As I say, these matters, while not unimportant, are
tangential to the main result which you have skillfully
described.
Sincerely

Justice Powell

.Jttptmu C!fourt of tlrt ~t~ .Statts
._as!rington. ~. (!f. 2llc?~~
CHAM!IERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , ..JR .

January 28, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

No. 82-1832

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Justice Powell requested that I write a memorandum
to you, informing you that he has read Justice Brennan's
letter of January 2, 1985, proposing some changes to the
opinion in this case. Justice Powell views these changes as
consistent with the rationale of the opinion, and proposes
to incorporate them in his draft, provided the Justices who
have already joined the opinion find Justice Brennan's proposals to be acceptable. If this suggestion meets with your
approval, the changes will be incorporated and a revised
draft circulated within a few days.

l~~<:,~

Lynda Guild Simpson
Law Clerk to Justice Powell

jlnpl-tm:t QJourt Df tlrt ~a .itatt•
:¥iu~. ~. QI. 2ll.?'l-"
CHAMI!IERS Of"

January 29, 1985

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
I have no objection to your accommodating the suggestions
made by Bill Brennan.
Sincerely,

~

Justice Powell.
cc: The Conference

.tnvrttttt Q}ltltd qf

tqt 1Juittb ;ibdt.tl'

Jfaglfiugtou,~. (!}.

2llbi~~

CHAMBE R S OF

.J U STIC E SA N D RA D AY O'CO N NOR

January 29, 1985

No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
Attention:

Linda Guild Simpson

Dear Lewis,
I think Bill Brennan's suggestions are generally
quite useful and that they will be helpful if incorporated
in the opinion with one exception. I was in dissent in
Boulder and am uncomfortable with the final underlined
portion of Bill's amendment to footnote 8. Would it be
agreeable to simply put a period after the words "statewide
concern"?
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

<!fomi llf tlt~ ',Jtmu~ .ihtttll
._ztSlthtgbttt. ~. <!f. 2llc?J!.;l

.:iu.pum:~

CHAMBERS OF

January 29, 1985

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
I have no objection to your accommodating the suggestions
made by Bill Brennan.
Sincerely,

~

___.;--

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.iu.prttttt <!}ourt of tlrt 'J!btitt~ .ifahg

'Jiagfringhtn. ~. <!}.

2ll&f~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 30, 1985

Re:

No. 82-1832-Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
I have no objection to your accommodating the suggestions
made by Bill Brennan.
Sincerely,

?./h·
T .M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.:8u:prttnt Qfltttrlaf tlrt 'J'nittb .:§tzdts
.asfrin:gtott. ~. <!J. 2llp~,;l
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

February 1, 1985

Re:

82-1832 - Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
I agree with Sandra's comments in her letter to you
of January 29th.
Sincerely~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

lgs/alb

February 8, 1985
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
Lee & Lynda

From:
Re:

v.

No. 82-1832 - Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
No. 82-1922 - Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.

u.s.

As you requested, we have reviewed both of these
opinions to be sure that each is consistent with the other.

A

new draft of each is attached so that you may read them together.
~

The Southern Motor Carriers draft incorporates most of the

~~:~

changes you requested.

The Town of Hallie draft incorporates not

-~

only changes to conform to Southern Motor Carriers, but also the
proposals advanced by Justice Brennan.

Because we have not yet ~;( ~

received responses from all of the Justices who had previously

~~

voted to join Hallie, the new draft has not been circulated.

~~

We would like to call your attention

specifically~o ~ ~

new footnote 3 in Town of Hallie, which clarifies the

-~

posture of the Midcal case.

procedu~

Justice Brennan had wanted us to add

the note to Hallie to clarify the point that although Midcal had
been brought as a mandamus action seeking an injunction against a
state agency, in fact the case had to be analysed as a case
involving state regulation of private parties.

Justice Brennan

believed, and rightly so, that this distinction is important both
(i) to explain why Midcal is distinguishable from Hallie, and
(ii) to clarify our analysis in Southern Motor Carriers and

J):,d...~ '1
~

141. ~

g

H(

explain why CAS was mistaken in holding that Midcal did not apply
to the rate bureau case.

To this end, we have not incorporated

all of your changes to the Southern Motor Carriers draft, but
have done the best we could to make both Southern Motor Carriers
and Hallie clear in their own right, while consistent with each
other.

We hope you approve.
The other point of note with respect to Hallie is old

fo~tn~ .

Justice Brennan had suggested that it either be

deleted or changed according to language he suggested.

Justice

O'Connor then objected to part of the proposed new language
because of her dissent in City of Boulder.

'x\w:s- . . . . . . . .

agreed with Justice O'Connor.

Justice Rehnquist

We concluded that it might be

easiest to delete footnote 8, since it is far from central to the
t

opinion.

Rory tells us that he believes Justice Brennan would be

just as happy with that course.

If you would like to leave some

remnant of footnote 8 in, however, let us know, and we
glad to try to work some resolution.

will be

Copies of Justice Brennan's

and Justice O'Connor's letters are attached for your information,
as well as the previous draft of Hallie for comparison.
Now that most your comments have been incorporated, the
Southern Motor Carriers opinion is more narrow, and we believe
greatly improved. We did not make a few of the changes that you
suggested, however, and would like to offer a brief explanation
for our failure to do so.

You correctly point out that every

member of the Court has not adopted Justice Stewart's statement
in Cantor that Parker immunity should extend to private parties.
See page 7 of the SMCRC draft.

You suggested that we add a

footnote describing Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Cantor,
in which he states that Parker should be limited to cases in
which a state official is the named defendant.

We believe,

however, that s ~ h :., dis ;.us~~r~ bl ,;_.::us ~ces Brennan
-~

~

and MaLshall. Although they joined Justice Stevens' ill--=
-....
considered opinion in Cantor, they are willing to adopt our

_.... Justice ~evens

position in this case.
are dissenting).

(Only

and

Justice ~ ite

They might find it troubling if their

inconsistency is highlighted in the Court's opinion.

Rory, who

is handling this case for Justice Brennan, has told us that
Justice Brennan is particularly concerned about the seemingly
irreconcilable positions that he has taken in several of the
state-action immunity cases.

If you nevertheless think that we

should discuss briefly Justice Stevens' Cantor opinion, we can do
so easily.

;l/J .

J ~44. ... ~ ~-~ ~~ ••~,

We hope that you will approve of Section IV, B.

•

We

firmly believe that Mississippi's clear intent to displace
competition among motor common carriers is enough to satisfy the
first prong of the Midcal test.

If you think that more than a

intent to displace competition should be required, however,
we think that the case should be remanded with respect to SMCRC's
actions in Mississippi.
You pointed out that for decades common carriers have
been submitting collective rate proposals to the Mississippi
Public Service Commission.

While this probably is true, we are

for two reasons reluctant to assert that the first prong of the
Midcal test has been satisfied by implicit legislative

~
4f~t~

ratification of collective ratemaking.

First, there is nothing

in the record indicating how long common carriers in Mississippi
have engaged in collective ratemaking.

' second, as far as we

know, there has never even been a regulation in Mississippi
approving of this anticompetitive practice.

The state

legislature certainly is less likely to be aware of agency's
policy if that policy is not set forth in regulations.
Therefore, it is difficult to argue in this case that a long
history of collective ratemaking in Mississippi shows that the
practice is authorized by the State as sovereign.

It is worth

noting that even the CAS dissenters were unwilling to state that
Mississippi had a clearly articulated policy in favor of
collective ratemaking.

Furthermore, there is some danger in

suggesting that the actions of private parties, if taken over a
long period of time, are entitled automatically to Parker
immunity.

The Court certainly does not want to establish a

"grandfather clause" in the state action immunity area.
We have eliminated most of the references to "private
parties" in the opinion.

/

We think it is important, however, that

the opinion clearly state that the Midcal test is applicable when
a private party is the defendant.

If the availability of Parker

-

...

immunity is to depend on the nature of the activity rather than

....

.

the identity of the defendant, Midcal's reach must be extended in
this manner.

~
satisfactory.

hope that you will find our "twin opinions"

)

We are, of course, ready to incorporate any

further changes that you may suggest.

/JoN..•~~~..;/-'

~'*~---···.,....,.,.
--[, ·1-'~

,juFmtt Ofourl of tlft ~~ ,jtate.s
:Jifu~ ~. Of. 2!lp~~
CHA M BERS O F

J U S TI CE W M. J . BR E NNAN, JR.

February 13, 1985

No. 82-1832
Town of Hallie, et al.
v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis,
I join with pleasure your 4th draft
in the above.
Sincerely,
\

r~
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w...

J. BRENNAN, JR.

February 13, 1985

No. 82-1832

Town of Hallie, et al.
v. City of Eau Claire

\

~

Dear Lewis,
I
wonder
if
at
page
5
you
have
unintentionally repeated a line.
At the end of
line 7 you state "we declined to accept City of
Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must
show more
than
a
state policy to displace
competition exists. We . • • . " Should that not
be omitted in light of what you say at the end of
the paragraph, to wit: "we declined to decide
whether governmental action by a municipality must
also
be
actively
supervised
by
the State"?
Whatever you do doesn't affect my full join.
Sincerely,

£;_
Justice Powell

cf tqt 'J!tttittb j;tatts
'lhtsfrittgtcn. ~. QI. 21l.;JJI.~

j)tqtrtm:t <!Jcurt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 19, 1985

Re:

No. 82-1832-Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~·
•

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

lgs March 22, 1985

No. 82-1832

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

This case presents the question whether the City of Eau
Claire, Wisconsin is exempt from the Sherman Act under the state
action doctrine of Parker v. Brown.

For the reasons stated in an

opinion filed with the Clerk today, we hold that it is.

The

decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is
affirmed by a unanimous Court.

lgs March 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Lynda

Re: Cases held for No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire
Attached is a proposed draft of a letter to the
Conference on the cases that were held for Town of Hallie.

As

you will see, 1 recommend that you vote to deny in all of the

--------------------~

cases, as it appears in each one that the Court of Appeals
anticipated (i) the standard we would apply for determining when
a State's policy has been clearly articulated, and (ii) the fact
that we would not require active state supervision where
municipal conduct was involved.
This is the first such letter 1 have prepared for you,
'

so be sure to let me know if it does not conform either to the
form or substance you prefer.

March 25, 1985
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
We held five cases pending our disposition of No. 821832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire.
Gold Cross Ambulance v. Kansas City, et al., No. 83138:

Resp Ambulance Service, Inc.

("AS!") is the only company

allowed by resp Kansas City to provide ambulance services in
Kansas City.
trust.

All of the stock of AS! is owned by a municipal

Petrs are two ambulance companies that are denied access

to most of the Kansas City market.

They sued resps, alleging

violations of the state and federal antitrust laws.

The DC

dismissed the antitrust claims.
CA8 affirmed, ruling that the Sherman Act claims were
barred under Parker v. Brown.

CA8 found that Missouri had

clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state policy
authorizing the City to provide ambulance service to its
residents by means of a single provider.

CA8 rejected petrs'

contention that the State must compel the anticompetitive
conduct, ruling that only contemplation or authorization by the
State was necessary.

CA8 also rejected petrs' contention that

there was no active state supervision, ruling that such
supervision was not necessary where a municipality's
anticompetitive conduct was at issue.
This case was originally held for Hoover v. Ronwin, No.
82-1474, but was relisted and held for Town of Hallie after it
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became clear that Hoover would not decide the compulsion and
state supervision claims where municipal conduct was at issue.
Because CA8 appears to have properly anticipated our decision in
Town of Hallie, I would deny cert in this case.

Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metr.
Area Solid Waste Agency, et al., No. 83-825:

Resp Des Moines and

several neighboring municipalities entered into a cooperative
venture for the collection of waste.

In order to finance a

municipal landfill, the municipalities formed resp Solid Waste
Agency, issued bonds, and agreed to use the landfill as the
exclusive site of solid waste disposal.
landfill.

Petr runs a private

Petr is not allowed to dispose of refuse collected

within resps' area in its landfill.

Petr sued, arguing that the

municipalities' arrangement violated the Sherman Act.

The DC

dismissed the action, and CA8 affirmed.
CA8 ruled that the Iowa legislature had authorized the
challenged municipal activity and had intended that the
municipalities would replace competition with regulation or some
form of monopoly public service.

CA8 also held there was no need

for the municipalities to show active state supervision because
their conduct is in an area of traditional municipal activity.
In so holding, CA8 relied on its decision in Gold Cross Ambulance
(No. 83-138--see above discussion).
This case was originally held for Hoover v. Ronwin, No.
82-1474, but was relisted and held for Town of Hallie after it
became clear that Hoover would not decide the claims presented

-
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here relating to municipal conduct under the state action
doctrine.

Because it appears that CA8 properly anticipated our

decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case.

Scott, et al. v. Sioux City, Iowa, et al., No. 84-360:
Petrs, land developers, bought 89 acres of land along the
southern limits of resp Sioux City in 1962.

In 1966, the City

annexed the land and zoned it for commercial use.

In 1971, the

City received federal funds to assist it in an urban renewal
project that had been in the works for nearly seven years.
Pursuant to the Iowa Urban Renewal Law, the City planned to
acquire and redevelop its run-down central business district.

In

1974, petrs announced plans to develop a regional shopping center
onJ part of its land on the outskirts of town.

Fearing that the

shopping center would hinder its downtown renewal project, resps
the City Council passed an ordinance barring construction of the
shopping center.

Petrs sued, alleging violations of the Sherman

Act and a claim for damages under §1983.

The DC granted summary

judgment for the City, relying on CA8's opinion in Gold Cross
Ambulance (No. 83-138--see above discussion).
CA8 affirmed.

It ruled that the Iowa Urban Renewal Law

specifically authorized the City to zone petrs' land in a way
that would help effectuate its urban renewal goals, and also
authorized the City to do "any and all things necessary" to carry
out those goals.

Moreover, the statute authorized the City's

cooperative relationship with the private developer it had chosen
to help it with the project.

These statutory provisions showed

- 4 -
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that the legislature had contemplated the selective zoning at
issue here.

CAB also ruled that active state supervision was

unnecessary.
Because CAB appears to have correctly anticipated our
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case.

Golden State Transit Corp v. City of Los Angeles, No.
B4-37B:

Petr operated a taxicab company in resp City.

Taxicab

operators must have a franchise granted by the City, and the City
Council makes the ultimate decision on whether to grant an
application.

In 19BO, all of the franchises expired and all

holders, including petr, applied for renewal.

The City Council

denied petr's application.
Petr sued, alleging that the City had violated the
Sherman Act and various provisions of the federal Constitution.
The DC granted the City partial summary judgment on the antitrust
claim under Parker v. Brown.

CA9 affirmed.

It ruled that the

City was required to show a state policy to displace competition
with regulation and to show that the legislature contemplated the
kind of action alleged to be anticompetitive.

It found those

requirements to be met by the Passenger Charter-Party Carriers'
Act.

CA9 also ruled that the City need not show active

supervision by the State.
Because CA9 appears to have correctly anticipated our
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case.
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Hybud Equipment Corp., et al. v. City of Akron, Ohio,
et al., No. 84-832:

Petrs are private firms that have for years

competed in the waste disposal and recycling business in resp
City and surrounding areas.

In 1976, the City decided to build

its own facility to recycle waste.

An Ohio state agency, the

Ohio water Development Authority ("OWDA"), issued revenue bonds
to finance the project.

An ordinance was enacted requiring all

solid waste collected within city limits to be transported to the
city facility and requiring a "tipping fee," to be set by the
City, to be paid to the facility for accepting the waste.

Petrs

sued, arguing that the ordinance and related measures violated
the Sherman Act and various provisions of the federal
Constitution.

The DC ruled for resps, holding that on the

antitrust claims, resps' actions were exempt from liability under
Parker v. Brown.
CA6 affirmed, concluding that the statutes governing
the OWDA issued a specific mandate to implement "the public
policy of the State • • • to provide • • • efficient and proper
methods of disposal, salvage, and reuse or recovery of resources
from solid waste

"

In so holding, CA6 noted that the City

was not required to point to a "specific, detailed legislative
authorization,"

(quoting City of Lafayette), but that there must

be evidence that the State authorized the municipality to act as
it did and contemplated the kind of action that is alleged to be
anticompetitive.
Because CA6 properly anticipated our decision in Town
of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case.

82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire
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1st draft 12/20/84
2nd draft 12/28/84
3rd draft 1/7/85
4th draft 2/12/85
Joined by HAB 12/21/84
soc 1/2/85
WHR 1/2/85
JPS 1/2/85
BRW l/2/85
CJ 1/2/85
WJB 2/13/85
2/19/85
Two copies to Mr. Lind 1/2/85

™

(Lynda~

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
. Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

12/19

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated:

_D_E_C_2_Q
_19S4
_____

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1832

.TOWN OF HALLIE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[December - , 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")--are four
Wisconsin townships located adjacent to respondent, the City
of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are located in Eau
Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against the City in
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by acquiring a
monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services in
Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such services to the provision of sewage collection and
1

The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.

..
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transportation services. 2 Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., the City had
obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, which included the
Towns; the facility is the only one in the market available to
the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the services to
individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a majority of
the individuals in the area vote by referendum election to
have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the City's sewage collection
and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an uniawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., and of a common law duty of a
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are
not at issue in this Court.
2

..
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v.
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that the
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorpo. rated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State
had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result.
The City's conduct thus constituted state action within the
meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The court also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a local government performing a traditional municipal function," 700 F. 2d,
at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker
immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be unwise in this situation, the
court believed, because it would erode traditional concepts of
local autonomy and home rule that were clearly expressed in
the state's statutes.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.
II
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the legislature. !d., at 351.
Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on the
other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust laws by
virtue of their status because they are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to

82-1832-0PINION
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obtain exemption, political subdivisions must demonstrate
that their anticompetitive activities were authorized by the
State "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with
regulation or monopoly public service." ld., at 413. Thus,
a showing by the municipality that its anticompetitive activities were duly authorized by the State entitles it to exemption from Sherman Act liability.
The determination that a municipality's activities constitute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded,
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state
policy" that was "actively supervised" by the StateC 435
U. S., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be able
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust
suit. Id., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's
free-market goals." ld., at 415-416.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply

G)
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literally the City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on
municipal governments general authority to govern local
affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to the
regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the City
could not meet this requirement of the state action test, we
declined to decide whether governmental action by a municipality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" component of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14.
It is.therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to say that its anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left
open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at · 51-52,
n. 14. We consider both of those issues below.

III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.
A

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that
a city operating a public utility
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"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the
area within which service will be provided and the
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the ,:g't ate's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the Departmei1t of Natural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3
B
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the
3
There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at
issue in this case.
'The Towns also rely on §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In
addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all
of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of_service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude.
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined

.

.,;
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anticompetitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects.
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would
result from this broad authority to regulate. SeeNew Motor
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978)
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d]
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982).
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. · The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or freemarket competition in the field of sewage services. The
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.
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provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be
made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation'~ test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind.
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435.
~s Court has never required the degree of specificity that
~
th: Towns insist is necessary. 6
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at
• Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
• Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would thwart
the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, § 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).
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415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemption.
This fact distinguishes those cases because a
municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume,
absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts
in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand,
may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own beOur view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v.
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court disagreed, concluding that the legislature intended the CitY. to undertake the
challenged actions. Those actions would therefore be ~exempt from the
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city.could
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314
N. W. 2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services.
7
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half. Also, as we have concluded in another case decided today, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States,-- U. S. --,a private party is not invariably required to show compulsion where the state authorization or approval is clear.
None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417,
spoke in terms of the State's dir~ction or authorization of the
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively expressed is good evidence of state policy, it is by no
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy.
IV

Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn.. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities.
We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a
municipality.
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As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed
above, see supra, at 11-IO , the requirement of active state
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to )3fate policy. In Midcal, we
stated that the active state supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman
Act's proscriptions "by casting a ... gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is
not a private party, but a municipality, there is little or no
danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it will seek to further
purely parochial public interests at the expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, be"'
cause of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant
to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it is clear that
state authorization exists, there is no need to require the
State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of
what is a properly delegated function. 8

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in
1s case
·
the Sherman Act. They were taken
pursuant to a c early articulated state policy to replace competition in the provision of sewerage services with regula-

I.e.. .
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tion. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered .
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1832

TOWN OF HALLIE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[December - , 1984]

JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")-are four
Wisconsi~ownships located adjacent to respondent, the City
of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are located in Eau
Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against the City in
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by acquiring a
monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services in
Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such services to the provision of sewage collection and
1

The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.
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transportation services. 2 Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., the City had
obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, ~ included the
Towns; the facility is the only one in the market available to
the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the services to
individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a majority of
the individuals in the area vote by referendum election to
have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the City's sewage collection
and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
2
The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., and of a common law duty of a
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are
not at issue in this Court.

;
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v.
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that the
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State
had contemplated that a~~~J. Jf!ects might result.
e 1ty s conduct thus +«state aM:fil!i within the
meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The court also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a local government performing a traditional municipal function," 700 F. 2d,
at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker
immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be unwise in this situation, the
court believed, because it would erode traditional concepts of
local autonomy and home rule that were clearly expressed in
the state's statutes.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.
II
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the legislature. I d., at 351.
·
unicipalities aBel a6fl:er sttbelh i~ion~ of the Stat~ on the
other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust laws by
virtue of their status because they are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to

~~
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obtain exemption, ~H*e&~JP'llll:J.Sl,l;mw must demonstrate
that their anticompetitive activities were authorized by the
State "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with
regulation or monopoly public service." I d., at 413. ~
-a- showing by the m~::mieipality that its antieompetitive aeti v~
ties were dnly anthorized by the State entitles it to exemp~
eon ft om Shennan Aet liability. a The determination that a municipality's activities constitute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded,
the mm1icipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state
policy'' that was "actively supervised" by the State~
U. S., at 410. The munit:ipality need not, however, "be able
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust
suit. I d., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's
free-market goals." Id., at 415-416.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply
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iiteFall$ the,lgity of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on
municipal governments general authority to govern local
affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to the
regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the City
could not meet this requirement of the state action test, we
declined to decide whether governmental action by a municipality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" component of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14.
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearl a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to
that its anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left ·
open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 51-52,
n. 14. We consider both of those issues below.

III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.
A

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that
a city operating a public utility
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"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the
area within which service will be provided and the
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the ,gtate's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3

l.C!. .

B
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the
There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at
issue in this case.
• The Towns also rely on §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities, in- - - eluding towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a ~eral enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. ~
addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all
of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of.service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude.
Nor does § 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined
3
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anticompetitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects.
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would
result from this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978)
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d]
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982).
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or freemarket competition in the field of sewage services. The
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.
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provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be
made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind.
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would
impose this kinc,i of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and
_ _ _ _ _ authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435.
~ fo..d1?'rus Court has never required the degree of specificity that
the Towns insist is necessary. 6
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at

OJ)

Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
6
Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter~V\~er-c.v. t
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would ~
,..._,....--;-~
the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of imrunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, § 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).
5
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415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for~·
eral reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemption.
This fact distinguishes those cases because a
municipality is an arm of. the State. We may presume,
absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts
in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand,
may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own beOur view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v.
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which
7

the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court disagreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the
challenged actions. Those actions would therefore be ~empt from the
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city.could
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314
N. W. 2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services .

.
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half. l.dso, as w8l:J.a¥8 eeReh~aea iR aRetheF ease G8eiG8G tg ~
Gay, 8e'bl!the1 n Motor Carriers Rate Cunfol ertee, hte. v. · .f:htited States,
U. 8.
, a pti9ate pa1 ty is not invad- 2 ably Ieqaiied to show eompnl~ion whete the state antnodza Q..tioH et' approval i~ deai . a None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417,
spoke in terms of the State's direction or authorization of the
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirmaIve y expressed ·
evidence of state policy, it is by no
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy.

IV
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities.
We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a
municipality.
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As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed
above, see supra, at ~' the requirement of active state
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to ,.g'tate policy. In Midcal, we
stated that the active state supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman
Act's proscriptions "by casting a ... gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is
·
,
a municipality, there is little or no
danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it will seek to further
purely parochial public interests at the expense of more over. riding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant
to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it is clear that
state authorization exists, there is no need to require the
State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of
what is a properly delegated function. 8

v
We conclude that the actions of the Cit of Eau Claire in
this case
t e erman Act. T ey were taken
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace competition in the provision of sewerage services with regulaIn addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to supervise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many ·ather
states, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town o
Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls , Ta6 1,1fis. 2el 633,$39, 314 N. W. Bel 32~
To require active supervision by the ~tate would erode local
~au=on:.,_o_m_ye~~:a-n"'l\
d limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of
statewide cone rn.
8

/
l. c.

.
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tion. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")-are four
Wisconsin townships located adjacent to respondent, the City
of Eau Clalre (the "City"). Town of Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are located in Eau
Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against the City in
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by acquiring a
monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services in
Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such services to the provision of sewage collection and
1

The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.
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transportation services. 2 Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., the City had
obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, which included the
Towns; the facility is the only one in the market available to
the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the services to
individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a majority of
the individuals in the area vote by referendum election to
have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the City's sewage collection
and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
2
The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq. , and of a common law duty of a
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are
not at issue in this Court.

-;r ~
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v.
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that the
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State
had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result.
The City's conduct thus constituted state action within the
meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The court also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a local government performing a traditional municipal function," 700 F. 2d,
at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker
immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be unwise in this situation, the
court believed, because it would erode traditional concepts of
local autonomy and home rule that were clearly expressed in
the state's statutes.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.

·n

The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting threugh its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the leg·
islature. ld., at 351.
Municipalitiet:RQ ot:Ref' saeaivisioB~f t:Re ~tat~ on the
other hand, are ot beyond the reach of the antitrust laws by
virtue of their status because they are not themselves sovereign . . City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to

?
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obtain exemption, peHtieal subdivisiofl~ must demonstrate
that their anticompetitive activities were authorized by the
State "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with
regulation or monopoly public service." Id., at 413. Thus,
a showing by the municipality that its anticompetitive activities were duly authorized by the State entitles it to exemption from Sherman Act liability.
The determination that a municipality's activities constitute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded,
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state
policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State, 435
U . S., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be able
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust
suit. Id., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's
free-market goals." Id., at 415-416.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply

-~~

~
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literally the City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on
municipal governments general authority to govern local
affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to the
regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the City
could not meet this requirement of the state action test, we
declined to decide whether governmental action by a municipality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" component of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14.
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to ~ that its anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left
open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 51-52,
n. 14. We consider both of those issues below.

III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.
A

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that
a city operating a public utility

?
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"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the
·area within which service will be provided and the
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the DepartmeJ1t of Nat ural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that territory refuses to become annexed to the citY. 3
B
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do pot
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the
3
There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at
issue in this case.
'The Towns also rely on §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In
addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all
of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude.
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anticompetitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects.
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would
result from this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978)
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute
provided regufu.tlJfy ~strrrcture-that inherently "displace[d]
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982).
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at ·issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or freemarket competition in the field of sewage services. The
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.
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provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be
made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind.
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and
authority to govern themselves. --4'35 ~u. S., at 434-435.
This Court has never required the degree of specificity that
the Towns insist is necessary. 6
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at
6
Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
6
Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would t-ftw~ ("
the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, § 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).

.
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415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemption.
This fact distinguishes those cases because a
municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume,
absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts
in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand,
may be presumed to be acting -primarily on his or its own beOur view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v.
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court disagreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the
challenged actions. Those actions would therefore be be exempt from the
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city.could
require before extending sewer services to the area." !d., at 540-541, 314
N. W. 2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services.
7
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half. Also, as we have concluded in another case decided today, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States,-- U. S. --,a private party is not invari~quired to show compulsion where the state authoriza-

v

'-lUII(_Qy approval~lear.

None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417,
spoke in terms of the State's direction or authorization of the
anticompetitive practice at issue. Tnis is so because where
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirmau _ A _ 1- tively expressed ioe ~od evidence of state policy, it is by no
r/!1.-V ~r
means a prerequisite to a finding ~hat a municipality acted
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy.
IV
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities.
We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a
municipality.
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As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed
above, see supra, at - - , the requirement of active state
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to State policy. In Midcal, we
stated that the active state supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman
Act's proscriptions "by casting a ... gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests rath than
the governmental interests of the ~ere the actor is
·
,
a municipalitJ(jJ. there is little or no
danger that it is involved in a private pr1ce- ing arrangement. The only real danger is that it will seek to further
purely parochial public interests at the expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant
to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it is clear that
. state authorization exists, there is no need to require the
State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of
what is a properly delegated function. 8

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in
this case do not violate the Sherman Act. They were taken
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace competition in the provision of sewerage services with regula8
In addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to supervise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many ·other
states, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of
Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 539, 314 N. W. 2d 321,
324 (1982). To require active supervision by the State would erode local
autonomy and"'limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of
statewide concern.
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tion. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")-are four
Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respondent, the City of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of
Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three
towns are located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed
suit against the City in United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and
alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 lJ. S. C.
~et seq., by acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sew~
~g~ treatment services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such services to the provi1

The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.
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sion of sewage collection and transportation services. 2
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C.
§§ 1251, et seq., the City had obtained federal funds to help
build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that included the Towns; the facility is the only one
in the market available to the Towns. The City has refused
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of the
Towns if a majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum election to have their homes annexed by the City,
see Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the
City's sewage collection and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and . transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
2
The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., and of a common law duty of a
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are
not at issue in this Court.

I
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v.
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that the
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State
had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result.
The City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to state authori- ~
zation within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The
court also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a
local government performing a traditional municipal function," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity woul~ also be unwise in
this situation, the court believed, because it would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and home rule that were
clearly expressed in the state's statutes.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.
II
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the .legislature. Id., at 351.
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service."
I d., at 413.
The determination that a municipality's activities constitute state action is not a purely ~ormalistic inquiry; the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded;
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state
policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State. 435 f
U. S., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be able
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust
suit. I d., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom
. . . to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's
free-market -goals." I d., at 415-416.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply ,I
the entire City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's I
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on
municipal governments general authority to govern local
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affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to
the regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the
City could not meet this requirement of the state action test,
we declined to decide whether governmental action by a
municipality must also satisfy the "active state supervision"
component of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14.
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active
state supervision" requirement. C~ty of Boulder, supra, at
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below.

. III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.
A

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that
a city operating a public utility
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the
area within which service will be provided and the
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municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the state's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3
B

The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the
statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti3
There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at
issue in this case.
'The Towns also rely on§§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities,
including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a
general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of
the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of service.
Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude.
Nor does § 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.
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competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. . It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects.
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would
result from this broad authority to regulate. SeeNew Motor
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978)
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d]
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982).
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or freemarket competition in the field of sewage services. The
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to
provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be
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made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for
the . delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind.
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In
fact, this Court has never requtled the degre·e of specificity
that the Towns insist is necessary. 6
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at
415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d

j

5

Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
6
Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would undercut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, § 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).

I

..
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431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for
several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private
parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemption. This fact distinguishes those cases because a municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the
public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be
presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf.
7
Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v.
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court disagreed, concludin that the le 'slature intended the City to undertake the
exempt from the
c a enged actions. Those actions ~ t erefore
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could
require before extending sewer services to the area." !d., at 540-541, 314
N. W. 2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services.

(.
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None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417,
spoke in terms of the State's direction or authorization of the
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is
by no means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality
acted pursuant to clearly articulated state policy .

•

IV

Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities.
We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor -is a
municipality.
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed
above, !ee B~l o:, at 9 lei the requirement of active state \
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy. In Midcal, we
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stated that the active state supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman
Act's proscriptions "by casting a . . . gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is
a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved
in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger
is that it will seek to further purely parochial public interests
at the expense of more overriding state goals. This danger
is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the
municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.
Once it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no
need to require the State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function. 8

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regulation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
8
In addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to supervise municipal conduct would be un~se. Wisconsin, like many other
states, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of
Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, supra, at 539, 314 N. W. 2d, at 324. To
require active supervision by the State would erode local autonomy and
possibly limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of statewide concern.
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TOWN OF HALLIE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January - , 1985]

JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")-are four
Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respondent, the City of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of
Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three
towns are located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed
suit against the City in United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and
alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 1 et seq., by acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such services to the provi'The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.
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sion of sewage collection and transportation services. 2
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C.
§§ 1251, et seq., the City had obtained federal funds to help
build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that included the Towns; the facility is the only one
in the market available to the Towns. The City has refused
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of the
Towns if a majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum election to have their homes annexed by the City,
see Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the
City's sewage collection and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-·
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
2

The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., and of a common law duty of a
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are
not at issue in this Court.
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v.
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that the
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State
had contemplated that anticornpetitive effects might result.
The City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to state authorization within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The
court also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a
local government performing a traditional municipal function," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be unwise in
this situation, the court believed, because it would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and horne rule that were
clearly expressed in the state's statutes.
'
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.
II

The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticornpetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the .legislature. I d., at 351.
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service."
!d., at 413.
The determination that a municipality's activities constitute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded,
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed ... state
policy'' that was "actively supervised" by the State. 435
U. S., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be able
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust
suit. I d., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's
free-market goals." I d., at 415-416.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In
that case; we found no antitrust immunity for California's
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply
the entire City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on
municipal governments general authority to govern local
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affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to
the regulation of cable television in the locaie. Because the ·
City could not meet this requirement of the state action test,
we declined to decide whether governmental action by a
municipality must also satisfy the "active state supervision"
component of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14.
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active
state supervision" require'ment. City of Boulder, supra, at
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below.

III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.
A

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that
a city operating a public utility
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the
area within which service will be provided and the

82-1832-0PINION

HALLIE v. EA U CLAIRE

6

municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the state's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3
B

The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the
statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti3

There is no such order of the Department of Nat ural Resources at
issue in this case.
' The Towns also rely on §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities,
including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a
general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of
the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of service.
Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude.
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.
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competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects.
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would
result from this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978)
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d]
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law 1!212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982).
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or freemarket competition in the field of sewage services. The
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to
provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be
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made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative his_tory that it intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind.
·
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In
fact, this Court has never required the degree of specificity
that the Towns insist is necessary. 6
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of.'" City of Lafayette, supra, at
415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d
5

Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
6
Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would undercut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, § 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).
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431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for
several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private
parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemption. This fact distinguishes those cases because a municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the
public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be
presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf:
Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v.
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court disagreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the
challenged actions. Those actions would therefore be exempt from the
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314
N. W. 2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services.
7
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None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417,
spoke in terms of the State's direction or authorization of the
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is
by no means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality
acted pursuant to clearly articulated state policy.
IV

Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities.
We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor ·is a
municipality.
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed
above, see supra, at 9-10, the requirement of active state
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy. In Midcal, we
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stated that the active state supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman
Act's proscriptions "by casting a . . . gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, ra.t her than
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is
a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved
in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger
is that it will seek to further purely parochial public interests
at the expense of more overriding state goals. This danger
is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the
municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.
Once it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no
need to require the State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function. 8

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regulation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
8

In addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to supervise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many other
states, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of
Hallie v. City ofChippewaFalls, supra, at 539, 314 N. W. 2d, at 324. To
require active supervision by the State would erode local autonomy and
possibly limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of statewide concern.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Braum, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), /when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I

II

Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of

~ ~ Union, and Town of Washington (the ~own~are four

Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respondent, the City of Eau Claire (the ~ityu,. Town of
Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three
towns are located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed
\
suit against the City in United States District Court for the
)
Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and
~alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 lJ. S.C.
et seq. ;'hy acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewtreatment services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such services to the provi-
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The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.

j
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sion of sewage collection and transportation services. 2
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C.
125 et seq.~ the City had obtained federal funds to help
build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that included the :rownsi the facility is the only one
in the market available to the Towns. The City has refused
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of the
Towns if a majority of the individuals in the area vote by ref1
erendum electi~ have their homes annexed by the City,
see Wis. Stat.~§§66.024(4)/144.07(1~~nd to use the (lq~J}f
City's sewage collection and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and . transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
'tate's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
~~~Uz..i(

j§

I

>5/

1

IK I

all~ed

The complaint also
violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. }§ 125~ et seq., and of a commonAlaw duty of a :'
J
utility to serve. The p'istrict oourt dismissed these claims, and they are
D fG
not at issue in this Court.
~

r

;,

S££

~

S',

82-1832-0PINION

HALLIE v. EAU CLAIRE

5(
*

3

Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982),~nd Parker v.
Brown, supra. / Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (~1983). / lt ruled that the ~ /
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State
had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result.
The City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to state authori-~
zation within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. - The
court also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a
local government performing a traditional municipal function, "..J'lOO F. 2d, at 384, :ictive state supervision was unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be unwise in
this situation, the court believed, because it would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and home rule that were
clearly expressed in the ~tate's statutes.
~
We granted certiorari, -4- U. S. (1984), and now H6 7
affirm.
II
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351./ Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the .legislature. !d., at 351. '
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette/ . Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities
/
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace _.competition with regulation or monopoly public service."
!d., at 413. /
The determination that a municipality's activities constitute state action is not a purely ~onnalistic inquiry; the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. / Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded,
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state
policy';-"fhat was "actively supervised"-'by the State. 435 f
U. S., at 410 . .....-The municipality need not, however, "be able
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization"..-fn
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust
suit. I d., at 415. / The plurality viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom
. . . to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhi- J
bitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's
free-market"goals." ,. . !d., at 415-416. ,
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980);-a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply J
the entire City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's I
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on
municipal governments general authority to govern local
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affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to
the regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the
~ty could not meet this requirement of the state action test,
we declined to decide whether governmental action by a
municipality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" /
component of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14. /
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive
activity constitutes state action. Moreover·, we have expressly left open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at
51-52, n. 14. ~ We consider both of those issues below.

~

~~ • ..,..(--

rf'J a

. III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.

!"'l

~ 4 ~ ,U;w.!~~..-j)f/ Wi~Stat.~§62.!8(1~nts authority to cities to con-

/ struct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid ../ This grant
of authority is supplemented by..,§ 66.069(2)(c),providing that
1\,
a city operating a public utility
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the
area within which service will be provided ·and the

I

I
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municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
/

~I

With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the , tate's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the Department of Nat ural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3
B

The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above , the
statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti3
There is no such order of the DepartmeJlt of Natural Resources at
issue in this case.
../
r-.::
• The Towns also rely on}§ 66. 076U) and)>6~0 .Q!'1li~CF-...· ..lsco_n_s.,..
in_c_o~~to
argue that the State's policy on tlie provision of sewage services is actually
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1( permits certain municipalities,
including towns , to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a
general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of
the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of service.
Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude.
Nor does § 66.30 rud the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.

\

t,dj~. St<tf,~YJrt./{tf,6 ll.ll\d
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competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. . It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to engage in conduct that would have anticom etitive effects.
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would
result from this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) /
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute
provided regulatory structure )hat inherently "displace[d]
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3,@ 54 (Supp. 1982). /
·
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of Boulder,~ arguing that
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or freemarket competition in the field of sewage services. The
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment mvolved in City of
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to
provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be
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made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was.5
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind. ·
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S. , at 434-435. In j
fact, this Court has never reqt8ed the degre·e of specificity I r /
that the Towns insist is necessary. 6
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that "'the legi~lature contemplated the
kind of action complained of.' ''-::/City of Lafayette, supra, at
41.5 (quoting the ([eicis@ of the / ourt of ,ippeals, 532 F. 2d

I

5
Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
'Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would undercut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action fromJ:.erai antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust La~O).n2.3(b) (Supp. 1982). /
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431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 / This is sufficient to satisfy the clear
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on langu~e in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). / we disagree with this contention for
several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private
parties-not municipalities-daiming the state)lction exemption. This fact distinguishes those cases because a municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the
public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be
presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf.
7
Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v.
City ofChiwewaFalls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982)( m which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The ,tate rfupreme ~ourt dis- s (~ I rs
agreed, concludin that the le 'slature intended the City to undertake the
c a enged actions. Those actions
t erefore
exempt from the
~ / ~tate's antitrust laws. Analy/ mg §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court
- concluded that the legislature had ''viewed annexation by the city of a sur- ~~
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid I2!:Q. quo that a city could '-J..f al -1
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541 / 314
N. W. 2d, at 325. /
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services.
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None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, ~455 U.S., at
56-57,-'ind City of Lafayette, ~435 U.S., at 416-417, /
spoke in tenns of the State's direction or authorization of the
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is
by no means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality
acted pursuant to clearly articulated state policy .

•

IV

/I

Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410 . ..,., In California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97 (1980){ a unanimous Court held that supervision is
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities.
We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor ·is a
municipality.
As with res;ect to the compulsion argument discussed
above,<iee aftiia. at 9 Wthe requirement of active state\
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy. In Midcal, we

/
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stated that the active state supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman
Act's proscriptions "by casting~ gauzy cloak of state~(
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." / 445 U. S., at 106. / Where a private party is
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is
a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved
in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger
is that it will seek to further purely parochial public interests
at the expense of more overriding state goals. This danger
is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the
municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.
Once it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no
need to require the State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function. 8

I

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regulation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.

It is so ordered.
In addition to being unnecessary, .requiring States actively to supervise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many other
;tates, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of
Hallie v. City ofChiwewaFalls, supra, at 539 ;'~14 N. W. 2d, at 324. 4 To
require active supervision by the State would erode local autonomy and
possibly limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of statewide concern.
8
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1832

TOWN OF HALLIE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[~ -, 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the.State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of
Union, and Town of Washington (the Towns}-are four Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respondent, the City of Eau Claire (the City). Town of Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against
the City in United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that
the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by
acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment
services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage
1

The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.
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collection and transportation services. 2 Under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the
City had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that included the Towns; the facility is the only one in the market
available to the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the
services to individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a
majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum
election to have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis.
Stat. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1) (1982), and to use the City's
sewage collection and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
State's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., and of a common-law duty of a utility to serve. The District Court dismissed these claims, and they are not
at issue in this Court.
2
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v.
Broum, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (1983). It ruled that the Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated
areas. The court therefore assumed that the State ha.9...£9ntemplated that anticompetitive effects might result)~ Xhe
City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to state authoriZation
within the meaning of Parker v. Broum, supra. The court
also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a local
government performing a traditional municipal function," 700
F . 2d, at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for
Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a
prerequisite to immunity would also be unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it would erode traditional
concepts of local autonomy and home rule that were clearly
expressed in the State's statutes.
We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.
II
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Broum. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the legislature. I d., at 351.
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive
authorized by the State "pursuant to state
·cy to displace
competition with regulation or mono y public service."
Id., at 413.
The determination that a m cipality's activities constiy formalistic inquiry; the State
tute state action is not a p
may not validate a
Icipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declarin · to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. 1
th
It acted pursuant to a
"clearly a · ulated an
a 1ve y expressed ... state policy" that as " ctivel su ervised" b the State. 435 U. S.
at 410.
e municipality need not
e a le to
n o a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in order
to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust suit.
Id., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as desirable
because it' preserv[ed] to the States their freedom ... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the
federal antitrust laws without at the same time permitting
purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's free-market
goals." Id., at 415-416.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
3
state action exemption was claimed by a private party.J:ln:-- \r
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to a.di~~=:JC.:
~ae eH~~ City of Lafayette
We held that Coloraoo's
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on
municipal governments general authority to govern local
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affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to
the regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the
city could not meet this requirement of the state action test,
we declined to decid~ whether governmental action by a
Sl:if>el'VisieB'b
municipality must also satis~ ike "aetive
'19Rlf>6Bel'lt ef Ute te~ 455 U. S., at 51-5 , n. 14.
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive
· activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below.

sfie

III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.
A
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.18(1) (1982) grants authority to cities
to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems.
The authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This
grant of authority is supplemented by Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 66.069(2)(c) (Supp. 1984), providing that a city operating a
public utility
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the

82-1832-0PINION
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area within which service will be provided and the
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order by the
Department of Natural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that
territory refuses to become annexed to the city{
B
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct~ As discussed above, the

®--7

There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at
· ue in this case.
The Towns also rely on Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 (1965
Supp. 1984) to argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage
services is actually procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside
from the fact that it was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not
support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain
municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit
the area of service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive
state attitude.
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.

~

~
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anticompetitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to
engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects.
~~g the analysis of City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. 389
\....V
{ll:J'i~~t is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to
proviae sewage services and also to determine the areas to be
served. We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would result from this broad authority to regulate. See
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96,
109 (1978) (no express intent to displace the antitrust laws,
but statute provided regulatory structure that inherently
"displace[d] unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P.
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, p. 54 (Supp.
1982).
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, arguing that the
Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the City
free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-market
competition in the field of sewage services. The analogy to
the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado Constitution allocated only the most general authority to municipalities to
govern local affairs. We held that it was neutral and did not
satisfy the "clear articulation" component of the state action
test. The Amendment simply did not address the regulation
of cable television. Under Home Rule the municipality was
to be free to decide every aspect of policy relating to cable
television, as well as policy relating to any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the express authority to

82-1832-0PINION
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take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home Rule
Amendment was."
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind.
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
ta e
· . Justice Stewart's dissent in City of
Lafayet e was concerned that the plurality's opinion would
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In
fact, this Court has never required the degree of specificity
that the Towns insist is necessaryJ
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that " 'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of.'" City of Lafayette, supra, at
415 (quoting the decison of the Court of Appeals, 532 F. 2d

@- ~Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the

discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
~Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
~ dftermine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would undercut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda &
D. Turner, Antitrust Law, ~ 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).

o/

~
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431, 434 (CA5 1976)).k This is sufficient to satisfy the clear
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemption.
This fact distinguishes those cases because a
municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, ab~ent a showin to the contrary, that the municipality acts in
\. .~..r the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may
be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf.

@-Jour

by

view of the le!Oslature's intent is supportod
Town of Halli• v.
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533,314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The State Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the
challenged actions. Those actions therefore were exempt from the State's
antitrust laws. Analyzing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could
require before extending sewer services to the area." !d., at 540-541, 314
N. W. 2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question ·of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services.
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None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, 455 U. S., at 56-57,
and City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416-417, spoke in terms
of the State's direction or authorization of the anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where the actor is
a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary
matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state
action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is by no
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy.
IV

Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plut{litl gpinion in City of Lafayette did
\ - --!S:ill,,., without elaboratio
that a city claiming the exemption
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities.
We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a
municipality.~

As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed
above, the requirement of active state supervision serves
essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring
that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant
to state policy. In Midcal, we stated that the active state

'~S~.S,,o.t ~1·5-. 'fl•.~

'"l~
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supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State
from circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by
casting ... a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S.,
at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to
further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality,
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private
price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it
will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the
expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it
is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to
require the State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function. ~

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regulation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
In addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to supervise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many other
States, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of
Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, supra, at 539, 314 N. W. 2d, at 324. To
require active supervision by the State would erode local autonomy and
possibly limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of statewide concern.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1832
TOWN OF HALLIE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of
Union, and Town of Washington (the Towns)-are four Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respondent, the City of Eau Claire (the City). Town of Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against
the City in United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that
the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by
acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment
services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage
1

The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.

-
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collection and transportation services. 2 Under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the
City had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that included the Towns; the facility is the only one in the market
available to the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the
services to individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a
majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum
election to have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis.
Stat. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1) (1982), and to use the City's
sewage collection and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The Di~trict Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
State's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
2

The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., and of a common-law duty of a utility to serve. The District Court dismissed these claims, and they are not
at issue in this Court.
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v.
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (1983). It ruled that the Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated
areas. The court therefore assumed that the State had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result, and concluded that the City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to
state authorization within the meaning of Parker v. Brown,
supra. The court also concluded that in a case such as this
involving "a local government performing a traditional
municipal function," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would
also be unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it
would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and home
rule that were clearly expressed in the State's statutes.
We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.
II

The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the legislature. Id., at 351.
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service."
Id., at 413.
The determination that a municipality's activities constitute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. On the other hand, in proving that a state policy to
displace competition exists, the municipality need not "be
able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization"
____in-:-:-or_d_~
-::r:-lto_ assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust
J-1.85 {[.5 . ,
suit. ~ at 415. Rather, the jpinie'ft suggested, without
deciding the issue, that it would be sufficient to obtain
Parker immunity for a municipality to show that it acted pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
. .. state policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State.
486lJ. ti.., at 410. The plurality viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's
free-market goals." Id., at 415-416.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. 3 In
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's
3
Midcal was originally brought as a mandamus action seeking an injunction against a state agency, the California Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control. The state played no role, however, in setting prices or
reviewing their reasonableness, activities carried out by the private wine
dealers. 445 U. S., at 100-101. The mere fact that the state agency was
a named defendant was not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from
that appropriate to a case involving the state regulation of private anticompetitive acts. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States,- U . S . - , - (1985).

82-1832-0PINION

HALLIE v. EA U CLAIRE

5

wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to accept City of Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must
show more tha~~t state policy to displace competition exists.
We held that Co orado's Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on municipal governments general authority to govern local affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive
conduct with respect to the regulation of cable television in
the locale. Because the city could not meet this requirement
of the state action test, we declined to decide whether governmental action by a municipality must also be actively supervised by the State. 455 U. 8., at 51-52, n. 14.
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below.

III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.
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A

Wisconsin Stat. § 62.18(1) (1982) grants authority to cities
to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems.
The authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This
grant of authority is supplemented by Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 66.069(2)(c) (Supp. 1984), providing that a city operating a
public utility
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the
area within which service will be provided and the
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the
Department of Nat ural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that
territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 4
B

The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct. 5 As discussed above, the
'There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at
issue in this case.
5
The Towns also rely on Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 (1965
and Supp. 1984) to argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage
services is actually procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside
from the fact that it was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not
support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain
municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory pre-

82-1832--0PINION
HALLIE v. EA U CLAIRE

7

statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anticompetitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to
engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects.
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. 389
(1978), it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to
provide sewage services and also to determine the areas to be
served. We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would result from this broad authority to regulate. See
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96,
109 (1978) (no express intent to displace the antitrust laws,
but statute provided regulatory structure that inherently
"displace[d] unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P.
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, p. 54 (Supp.
1982).
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of B,oulder, arguing that the
Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the City
free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-market
competition in the field of sewage services. The analogy to
the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder is inscription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit
the area of service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive
state attitude.
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.
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apposite. That Amendment to the Colorado Constitution allocated only the most general authority to municipalities to
govern local affairs. We held that it was neutral and did not
satisfy the "clear articulation" component of the state action
test. The Amendment simply did not address the regulation
of cable television. Under Home Rule the municipality was
to be free to decide every aspect of policy relating to cable
television, as well as policy relating to any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, .the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the express authority to
take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home Rule
Amendment was. 6
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind.
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
State might have deleterious and unnecessary consequences.
Justice Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette was concerned
that the plurality's opinion would impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon
municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In fact, this Court has never
required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist is
necessary. 7
Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
7
Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
6
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In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of.'" City of Lafayette, supra, at
415 (quoting the decison of the Court of Appeals, 532 F. 2d
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 8 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would undercut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda &
D. Turner, Antitrust Law, ~ 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).
8
Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v.
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The State Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the
challenged actions. Those actions therefore were exempt from the State's
antitrust laws. Analyzing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314
N. W. 2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services.
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U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemption.;,e2 This fact distinguishes those cases because a ~
m_(ni~~ty is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a snowing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in
the public interest. 9 A private party, on the other hand,
may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own
behalf.
None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, 455 U. S., at 56-57,
and City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416-417, spoke in terms
of the State's direction or authorization of the anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where the actor is
a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary
matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state
action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is by no
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy.
IV
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did
9
Among other things, municipal conduct is invariably more likely to be
exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct. Municipalities in some
states are subjel o "sunshine" laws or other mandatory disclosure regulations, and munic1 al officers, unlike corporate heads, are checked to some
degree through e electoral process. Such a position in the public eye
may provide some greater protection against antitrust abuses than exists
for private parties.

.r
'
,...

~
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suggest, without elaboration and without deciding the issue,
that a city claiming the exemption must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively supervised by the State.
435 U. S., at 410. In California Retail Liquor Dealers
Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a
unanimous Court held that supervision is required where the
anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of
Boulder, however, the most recent relevant case, we ex___....-;r...;:;e.-ss;;.;;l~left this issue open as to municipalities. 455 U. S.,
,.~ )-"'"
at 51-52 n. 14. We now conclude that the active state supervision r quirement should not be imposed in cases in which
the actor is a municipality. 10
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed
above, the requirement of active state supervision serves
essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring
that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant
to state policy. In Midcal, we stated that the active state
supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State
· from circumventing the Sherman · Act's proscriptions "by
casting ... a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S.,
at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to
further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality,
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private
price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it
will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the
expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the municipal10
In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active
state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that issue. Where state or municipal regulation of a private party is
involved, however, active state supervision must be shown, even where a
clearly articulated state policy exists. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, supra,- U. S., a t - .
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ity act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it
is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to
require the State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function.

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regulation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of
Union, and Town of Washington (the Towns)-are four Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respondent, the City of Eau Claire (the City). Town of Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against
the City in United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that
the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by
acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment
services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage
'The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.
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collection and transportation services. 2 Under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the
City had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that included the Towns; the facility is the only one in the market
available to the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the
services to individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a
majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum
election to have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis.
Stat. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1) (1982), and to use the City's
sewage collection and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
State's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
2

The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., and of a common-law duty of a utility to serve. The District Court dismissed these claims, and they are not
at issue in this Court.
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v.
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (1983). It ruled that the Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated
areas. The court therefore assumed that the State had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result, and con- '
eluded that the City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to
state authorization within the meaning of Parker v. Brown,
supra. The court also concluded that in a case such as this
involving "a local government performing a traditional
municipal function," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would
also be unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it
would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and home
rule that were clearly expressed in the State's statutes.
We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.
II
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the legislature. !d., at 351.
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service."
Id., at 413.
The determination that a municipality's activities constitute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. On the other hand, in proving that a state policy to
displace competition exists, the municipality need not "be
able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization"
in order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust
suit. ~' at 415. Rather,
suggested, without
deciding the issue, that it wou be sufficient to obtain
Parker immunity for a municipality to show that it acted pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
. . . state policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State.
iaijp. 8., at 410. The plurality viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's
free-market goals." Id., at 415-416.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. 3 In
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's
s Midcal was originally brought as a mandamus action seeking an injunction against a state agency, the California Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control. The state played no role, however, in setting prices or
reviewing their reasonableness, activities carried out by the private wine
dealers. 445 U. S., at 100-101. The mere fact that the state agency was
a named defendant was not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from
that appropriate to a case involving the state regulation of private anticompetitive acts. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States, U. S. - , (1985).

,
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wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to ac- ~
ce t Cit of Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must
s ow more tha a state policy to displace competition exists.
We held that Co orado's Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on municipal governments general authority to govern local affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive
conduct with respect to the regulation of cable television in
the locale. Because the city could not meet this requirement
of the state action test, we declined to decide whether governmental action by a municipality must also be actively su- }
pervised by the State. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14.
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below.

III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.
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A
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.18(1) (1982) grants authority to cities
to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems.
The authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This
grant of authority is supplemented by Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 66.069(2)(c) (Supp. 1984), providing that a city operating a
public utility
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the
area within which service will be provided and the
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the
Department of Nat ural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that
territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 4
B

The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct. 5 As discussed above, the

\

'There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at
issue in this case.
5
The Towns also rely on Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 (1965
and Supp. 1984) to argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage
services is actually procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside
from the fact that it was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not
support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain
municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory pre-

I
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anticompetitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to"refuse to serve unannexed areas. It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to
engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects.
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. 389
(1978), it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to J
provide sewage services and also to determine the areas to be
served. We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would result from this broad authority to regulate. See
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96,
109 (1978) (no express intent to displace the antitrust laws,
but statute provided regulatory structure that inherently
"displace[d] unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P.
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, p. 54 (Supp.
1982).
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, arguing that the
Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the City
free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-market
competition in the field of sewage services. The analogy to
the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder is inscription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit
the area of service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive
state attitude.
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.
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apposite. That Amendment to the Colorado Constitution allocated only the most general authority to municipalities to
govern local affairs. We held that it was neutral and did not
satisfy the "clear articulation" component of the state action
test. The Amendment simply did not address the regulation
of cable television. Under Home Rule the municipality was
to be free to decide every aspect of policy relating to cable
television, as well as policy relating to any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the express authority to
take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home Rule f
Amendment was. 6
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind.
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
State might have deleterious and unnecessary consequences. I·
Justice Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette was concerned
that the plurality's opinion would impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon
municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In fact, this Court has never
required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist is
I
necessary. 7

I

6
Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
I 7 Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
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In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of.'" City of Lafayette, supra, at
415 (quoting the decison of the Court of Appeals, 532 F. 2d
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 8 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428

f

also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would undercut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda &
D. Turner, Antitrust Law, ~ 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).
8
0ur view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v.
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The State Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the
challenged actions. Those actions therefore were exempt from the State's
antitrust laws. Analyzing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could
require before extending sewer services to the area." !d., at 540-541, 314
N. W. 2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services.

I
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U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemption.
This fact distinguishes those cases because a
municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in
the public interest. 9 A private party, on the other hand, J
may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own
behalf.
None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, 455 U. S., at 56-57,
and City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416-417, spoke in terms
of the State's direction or authorization of the anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where the actor is
a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary
matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state
action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is by no
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy.

IV
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did
9

Among other things, municipal conduct is invariably more likely to be
exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct. Municipalities in some
states are subject.!o "sunshine" laws or other mandatory disclosure regulations, and munictA>al officers, unlike corporate heads, are checked to some
degree through the electoral process. Such a position in the public eye
may provide some greater protection against antitrust abuses than exists
for private parties.

~

J;
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suggest, without elaboration and without deciding the issue,
that a city claiming the exemption must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively supervised by the State.
435 U. S., at 410. In California Retail Liquor Dealers
Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a
unanimous Court held that supervision is required where the
anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of
Boulder, however, the most recent relevant case, we exressl left this issue open as to municipalities. 455 U. S.,
at 51-5 n. 14. We now conclude that the active state supervision r quirement should not be imposed in cases in which
the actor is a municipality. 10
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed
above, the requirement of active state supervision serves
essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring
that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant
to state policy. In Midcal, we stated that the active state
supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State
from circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by
casting ... a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S.,
at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to
further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality,
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private
price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it
will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the
expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the municipal-

t

I
I

10

In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active
state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that issue. Where state or municipal regulation of a private party is
involved, however, active state supervision must be shown, even where a
clearly articulated state policy exists. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, supra,- U. S., a t - .
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ity act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it
is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to
require the State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function.
J

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regulation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.

To: The Chief Justice
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Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a municipality's
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker
v. Broum, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of
Union, and Town of Washington (the Towns)-are four Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respondent, the City of Eau Claire (the City). Town of Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against
the City in United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that
the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by
acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment
services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage
'The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties.
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collection and transportation services. 2 Under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the
City had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that included the Towns; the facility is the only one in the market
available to the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the
services to individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a
majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum
election to have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis.
Stat. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1) (1982), and to use the City's
sewage collection and transportation services.
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns contended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over
the provision of sewage collection and transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace competition with regulation. The court also found that the State
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the
State's Department of Natural Resources, that was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land.
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications
2

The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., and of a common-law duty of a utility to serve. The District Court dismissed these claims, and they are not
at issue in this Court.
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v.
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (1983). It ruled that the Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated
areas. The court therefore assumed that the State had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result, and coneluded that the City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to
state authorization within the meaning of Parker v. Brown,
supra. The court also concluded that in a case such as this
involving "a local government performing a traditional
municipal function," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would
also be unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it
would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and home
rule that were clearly expressed in the State's statutes.
We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. - - (1984), and now
affirm.
II

The starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the legislature. I d., at 351.
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities

I
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service."
Id., at 413.
The determination that a municipality's activities constitute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra,
at 351. On the other hand, in proving that a state policy to
displace competition exists, the municipality need not "be
able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization"
in order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust
suit. 435 U. S., at 415. Rather, City of Lafayette suggested, without deciding the issue, that it would be sufficient
to obtain Parker immunity for a municipality to show that it
acted pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed ... state policy" that was "actively supervised" by
the State. Id., at 410. The plurality viewed this approach
as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom ... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same
time permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's free-market goals." I d., at 415-416.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. 3 In
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's
Midcal was originally brought as a mandamus action seeking an injunction against a state agency, the California Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control. The state played no role, however, in setting prices or
reviewing their reasonableness, activities carried out by the private wine
dealers. 445 U. S., at 100-101. The mere fact that the state agency was
a named defendant was not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from
that appropriate to a case involving the state regulation of private anticompetitive acts. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States, U. S. - , (1985).
3

I
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wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legislative policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to ac- ~
cept City of Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must
show more than that a state policy to displace competition exists. We held that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment to its
Constitution, conferring on municipal governments general
authority to govern local affairs, did not constitute a "clear
articulation" of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive
conduct with respect to the regulation of cable television in
the locale. Because the city could not meet this requirement
of the state action test, we declined to decide whether governmental action by a municipality must also be actively su- ~
pervised by the State. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14.
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipality will be entitled to the protection of the state action exemption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have never fully considered, however, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left open the question whether action by a municipality-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below.

III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statutory structure in some detail.
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A

Wisconsin Stat. § 62.18(1) (1982) grants authority to cities
to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems.
The authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This
grant of authority is supplemented by Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 66.069(2)(c) (Supp. 1984), providing that a city operating a
public utility
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the
area within which service will be provided and the
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond
the area so delineated."
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and
the Department may order that such connections be made.
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the
Department of Natural Resources for the connection of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that
territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 4

I

B

The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provision of sewage services because they make no express mention of anticompetitive conduct. 5 As discussed above, the f

J 'There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at
J

issue in this case.
6
The Towns also rely on Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 (1965
and Supp. 1984) to argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage
services is actually procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside
from the fact that it was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not
support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain
municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory pre-
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anticompetitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legislature to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to
engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects.
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. 389
(1978), it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to
provide sewage services and also to determine the areas to be
served. We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would result from this broad authority to regulate. See
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W . Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96,
109 (1978) (no express intent to displace the antitrust laws,
but statute provided regulatory structure that inherently
"displace[d] unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P.
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, p. 54 (Supp.
1982).
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, arguing that the
Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the City
free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-market
competition in the field of sewage services. The analogy to
the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder is inscription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit
the area of service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procomp'etitive
state attitude.
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipalities out of the market.

I
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apposite. That Amendment to the Colorado Constitution allocated only the most general authority to municipalities to
govern local affairs. We held that it was neutral and did not
satisfy the "clear articulation" component of the state action
test. The Amendment simply did not address the regulation
of cable television. Under Home Rule the municipality was
to be free to decide every aspect of policy relating to cable
television, as well as policy relating to any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the express authority to
take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home Rule
Amendment was. 6
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of
this kind.
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the
State might have deleterious and unnecessary consequences. 1
Justice Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette was concerned
that the plurality's opinion would impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon
municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In fact, this Court has never
required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist is
necessary. 7
I

I

f

8
Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions.
I 7 Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable
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In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provisions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at
415 (quoting the decison of the Court of Appeals, 532 F. 2d
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 8 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear I
articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" requirement of the state action test requires at least that the
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing,
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428

l

also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would undercut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda &
D. Turner, Antitrust Law, U12.3(b) (Supp. 1982).
8
Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v.
City ofChippe:wa Falls, 105 WiB. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the requirement of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The State Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the
challenged actions. Those actions therefore were exempt from the State's
antitrust laws. Analyzing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314
N. W. 2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, decide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewerage services.
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U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemption. This fact distinguishes those cases because a municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a
showing 'to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the
public interest. 9 A private party, on the other hand, may be
presumed to be acting primarily .on his or its own behalf.
None of our cases involving the application of the state action exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, 455 U. S., at 56-57,
and City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416-417, spoke in terms
of the State's direction or authorization of the anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where the actor is
a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary
matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state
action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is by no
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy.
IV
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did
suggest, without elaboration and without deciding the issue,
9
Among other things, municipal conduct is invariably more likely to be
exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct. Municipalities in some
states are subject to "sunshine" laws or other mandatory disclosure regulations, and municipal officers, unlike corporate heads, are checked to some
degree through the electoral process. Such a position in the public eye
may provide some greater protection against antitrust abuses than exists
for private parties.
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that a city claiming the exemption must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively supervised by the State.
435 U. S., at 410. In California Retail Liquor Dealers
Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a
unanimous Court held that supervision is required where the
anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of
Boulder, however, the most recent relevant case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities. 455 U. S.,
at 51-52, n. 14. We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in
which the actor is a municipality. 10
I
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed
above, the requirement of active state supervision serves
essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring
that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant
to state policy. In Midcal, we stated that the active state
supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State
from circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by
casting ... a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S.,
at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to
further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality,
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private
price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it
will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the
expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it

I

10

In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active
state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that issue. Where state or municipal regulation of a private party is
involved, however, active state supervision must be shown, even where a
clearly articulated state policy exists. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, supra,- U. S., a t - .
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is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to
require the State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function.

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regulation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
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injunctive

relief

and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act,

u.s.c.

§1

et

seq.,

by

acquiring

a

monopoly

over

15
the

provision of sewage treatment services in Eau Claire and
Chippewa

Counties,

services

to

transportation

the

and

by

provision

.
2
services.

Pollution Control Act, 33
had

obtained

treatment

~
~

tying

federal

facility

of

funds
the

of

such

collection

and

Federal

the

Water

§§1151, et seq., the City
to
Eau

help

build

Claire

a

Service

sewage
Area,

included the Towns: the facility is the only one in

the market available to the Towns.

2 The

provision

sewage

Under

u.s.c.

within

the

The City has refused

complaint also alleged violations of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S. C. §§1151, et seq. ,
and of a common law duty of a utility to serve.
The
district court dismissed these claims, and they are not at
issue in this Court.

4.

to supply sewage treatment services to the

~ :h t ~es
~

Towns4 ~ r:

the services to individual landowners

in the Towns if the individuals agree also to be annexed
by the City and

to use the City's sewage collection and

transportation services.
Alleging

that

they

are

potential

competitors

of

the

and transportation of sewage, the
Towns contended in the district court that the City used

-

-

its monopoly over
monopoly

over

the

sewage

treatment

provision

of

to gain

sewage

an

unlawful

collection

and

transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act.
They also contended that the City's actions constituted an
illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal
with the Towns.

f7
,

5.

The district court ruled for

It found that

~

Wisconsin's

~-

the City.

s~~~t~nu~~o~r~~
~~
s~c~b~eme

municipal

the

regulating

-1

P'~
9 ~-, , /

provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy

~·

to replace competition with

~\~

;;vt
r1 }'
~othe

adequately

supervised

state

Department

regulation~Athat

the State

the municipality's conduct

through

Natural

Resources,

~ was

municipal

decisions

concerning

of

~~

authorized

~~

provision of sewage services and corresponding annexations

~ f ,, r/'

~~

''

f

of

to

land .

review

Cnnseque<>tl"" -,;.;:;,

court

that

concluded

the

I

~~~

~~
p

~~·
~ U-

~rt.

City's allegedly anticompetitive conduct fell

within the

state action exemption to the federal antitrust laws, as
set

forth

Boulder,

~~ t

in
455

Community

u.s.

40

Communications

Co.

{1982), and Parker v.

dismissed the complaint.

v.

City

of

Brown, supra - g

6.

The

United

States

Circuit affirmed.

Court

t~he ~a

Appeals

for

700 F.2d 376 (CA7 1983).

the Wisconsin statutes

d

of

~

authoriz~

A

the

Seventh

It ruled that

the City

to ~
I{

.

of sewage services and to refuse to provide such

services to unincorporated areas •.

~ourtA~ ~tate

I '= i ~=tt::;#
had

anticompetitive effects might result.

contemplated

that

The City's conduct

thus constituted state action within the meaning of Parker
v. Brown, supra.
such as

this

The court also concluded that in a case

involving

"a local government performing a

traditional municipal function," 700 F.2d, at 384, active
state supervision was unnecessary for
apply •
1\

7

delegated
state

T;e

government

was

exercising

1\

authority

policy.

local

Parker immunity to

pursuant
Requiring

to

a

such

clearly

articulated

supervision

as

a

7.

prerequisite
situation,

to

the

irnrnuni ty
court

would

also

believed,

be

because

unwise
it

in

would

this
erode

traditional concepts of local autonomy and horne rule that

l
were clearly expressed in the state's statutes.
We

granted

u.s.

certiorari,

(1984),

and

now

affirm.
(J../

II

~-

As

~

~~~~.~

~tv, eft

til-o3)~

we

(1984) ,

analysis

noted
[104

~

~~~

s.ct.,

p ar k er

to construe

anticornpetitive
legislature.

~~.

H<.'-v

the

state

"starting point

action

Brown."

v.

~~

a:.,_~~

the

In

doctrine
Parker,

Sherman Act

~-~aetiQQs

~~
~

at __],
the

u.s.

Ronwin,

in
is

relying

on

principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the Court
refused

~~ ~

v.

Hoover

involving

~,t-~
. of
reason1ng
a-~~~-~'-'

~
- et-1- 1/U.A__.

in

~
~

317

u.s.,

of

a

State

at 350-351.

as

applying

acting

to the

through

its

Rather, it ruled that

8.

the

Sherman

Act

was

intended

to

prohibit

private

restraints on trade, and it refused to infer an intent to
"nullify a state's control over

its officers and agents"

in activities directed by the legislature.
Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on
the

other

hand,

~t~e ~Hol~sion

are not

f£9ffi

the

'\

reach

of

because

the
they

anti trust
are

not

laws

themselves

Lafayette v.

Louisiana Power

412

Rather,

(1978).

by virtue of . their

&

sovereign.

Light Co.,

to obtain exemption,

subdivisions must demonstrate

that

435

7

statu~
City

u.s.

of
389,

political

their anticompetitive

activities were directed by the State "pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly
public
Thus,

service."
a

showing

Id. ,
by

at

413
the

(opinion of BRENNAN,
municipality

that

J.) •

its

9.

activities

anticompetitive

action

state

constitute

entitles it to exemption from Sherman Act liability.

constitute
inquiry;

state
the

a

municipality's

action

is

not

State

anticompetitive
lawful.
of

that

determine

To

may

conduct

not

a

purely

validate

simply

by

a

plurality

concluded

formalistic

municipality's

declaring

Parker v. Brown, supra, at 351.

Lafayette

activities

that

it

to

be

Rather, the City
the

municipality

.vz_j..~
mu ,

resent evidenc~ that it acted pursuant to a "clearly

articulated

and

affirmatively

expressed

state

4d-

policy" wMen was "actively supervised" by the State, 435

u.s. ,

at

410

(opinion

of

BRENNAN,

J.) •

the

\

municipality

need

not

"be able

to pbint to a

detailed legislative authorization"

specific,

in order to assert a

successful Parker defense to an antitrust suit.

Id., at

10.

415

(opinion of BRENNAN, J.).

approach
States

as

desirable

their

The plurality viewed this

because

freedom

to

it

"preserv[ed)

administer

state

to

the

regulatory

policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust
laws without at the same time permitting purely parochial
interests

to

disrupt

the

Nation's

free-market

goals."

Id., at 415-416 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.).
In
Midcal

California
Aluminum,

Court applied the

Retail
Inc.,

Liquor
445

u.s.

Dealers
97

Association

(1980),

~l':!'!~
' ~ed

a

v.

unanimous

test to a case

"

in which the State's agent was ·a private party.

In that

case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's wine
pricing system even though there was a clear legislative
policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance,
h

ere

was

~
no

"\

state

supervision

of

the

,/

eeo~ee

>-

anticompetitive

11.

activity.

When

we

;:z:

again

addressed

the

issue of a

municipality's exemption from the antitrust laws in City
of Boulder, supra, however, we declined to apply fully the
City of Lafayette plurality's two-pronged test.
that

Colorado's

Home

Rule

Amendment

We ~
to

its

Constitution, conferring on municipal governments general
authority
"clear

to govern local affairs,

articulation"

of

a

did not constitute a

state

policy

to

authorize

anticompetitive conduct with respect to the regulation of
cable
not

television

pass

the

in the

"clear

locale.

Because the city could

articulation"

--yt.<_~

state

'\

action

test,

governmental

we

exprees-ly

~

r9fueed

to

decide

whether

action by a municipality must also satisfy

the "active state supervision"

~
of the test.

~

1\
51-52, n. 14.

1

Id. , at

12.

It

is

therefore

municipality
state

will

action

clear

be

from

entitled

exemption

to

our
to

the

cases

the

that

before

protection of

anti trust

laws,

it

a

the
must

demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity

(;L,~~~)~~
pursuant

to

addressed,

1\

s.t.a t e...

however,

di
how

~;. ect i:;sn .

clearly

We
a

have

state

never

fully

policy must

be

articulated for a municipality to be able to say that its

~}
anticompetitive activity constitutes state action, ~ we
....,
have expressly left open the question of whether action by
a

municipality--like

action

by

a

private

party--must

satisfy the .. active state supervision .. requirement.

City

~
of Boulder,

supra,

at 51-52,

those issues below.
III

n.

14.

We address both of

13.

of

the

Wisconsin

allegedly

Code

to

support

its

activity

anticompetitive

claim

that

constitutes

its
state

action.
the statutory structure in some detail.
A

Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.18(1) grants authority to cities to
construct,
The

add

authority

reasonable

to,

alter,

includes

particularity

and
the

the

repair
power

sewerage
to

district

systems.

"describe
to

be

with

[served]."

This grant of authority is supplemented by §66.069(2) (c),

~

~h

provides that a city operating a public utility

"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service
in unincorporated areas.
Such ordinance shall
delineate the area within which service will be
provided and the municipal utility shall have no
obligation
to
serve
beyond
the
area
so
delineated."

14.

With

respect

provides

that

to
the

joint
State

sewerage

systems,

Department of

Natural

§144.07(1)
Resources

may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so
that

other

cities,

towns,

or

areas

may

connect

to

the

system, and the Department may order that such connections
be made.

Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order

by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection
of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void
if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city.
The Court of Appeals ruled,

and we agree,

statutory provisions evidence a
affirmatively
competition
provision

of

expressed"
with

state

regulation

sewerage

in

services.

that

these

"clearly articulated and
policy

to

displace

the

area

of

municipal

The

statutes

expressly

authorize the City to construct a sewerage system and to

15.

provide sewage services;

it also permits the City to Hr
A

the area within which to extend such services and imposes
no

obligation

These

on

the

statutory

legislature

City

provisions

contemplated

the

to

serve

beyond

that

area.

plainly

show

that

"the

kind

action

of

of," City of Lafayette, supra, at 415 ,§

~ -i!J~he
is

that

complained

pinion of BRENNAN,

necessary consequence of this statutory structur
the

services and

City
to

is empowered both

refuse

to deal

with

to provide sewerag
parties

who do

comply with its conditions. 3

3 our

view of the legislature's intent is supported by
Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2d 533,
314 N.W.2d 321 (1982), in which the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge under
state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in
a case quite similar to the one at bar.
There, the Town
of Hallie argued that the City's refusal to provide it
with
sewage
treatment
services,
the
requirement of
annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision
of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage
collection and other city services, violated the state
Footnote continued on next page.

-4

16.

B

The

Towns contend

that

these

statutory provisions do

not evidence a state policy to displace competition in the
provision of sewage services because they make no express
mention of anticompetitive conduct. 4

~

~
City'~
i~l:l WG~alo therefo/e~
1

antitrust laws.
The state supreme cou 5 1-disagr
concluding that the legislature intended the
to
under take the challenged actions, wb
be
d~~m~g
to be exempt from the state's ant1trust laws.
Analysing
§§66.069(2) (c)
and
144.07(lm),
the
court
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by
the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a
reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before
extending sewer services to the area."
Id., at 540-541,
314 N.W.2d 325.
--Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does
not, of course, decide the question presented here of the
City's immunity under the federal anti trust laws, it is
instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal
provision of sewerage services.
4

The Towns also rely on §§66. 076 (1) and 66.30 of the
Wisconsin code to argue that the State's policy on the
provision of sewage services is actually procompeti ti ve.
This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it
was not raised below, the prov~sions relied upon do not
support the contentio~. F~r ft t is true that §66.076(1)
permits enumerated municipalities, including towns, to
operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general
enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription.
Footnote continued on next page.

17.

As

discussed

e..-

contemplat1all

~ t.~t t!ate

anticompetitive
foreseeable

for

statutes
a_

that tae City
conduct

conduct.

result

of

serve unannexed areas.
contend,

the

above,

empowering

the

City

to

is

refuse

a
to

It is not necessary, as the Towns

.f0c-}1h~~

the State legislature to have stated

in sE>

---{

O many
that

d

words that it expected the City to engage in conduct
would

have

anticompetitive

effects.

Applying

the

In addition, subsection ( 8) of §66. 076 incorporates into
the enabling statute all of the limitations of §66. 069,
including the power to limit the area of service.
Thus,
§66.076(1)
does
not
express
a
procompetitive
state
attitude. j~
):'
d)
9.)..
Nor .H5 §66. 30 of ·~ gJ;eatQr aid ~ the Towns. .Jil.A-at
seotion is a general provis!P~~ concerning all utilities-not just sewerage systems, ~h permits municipalities to
enter into cooperative agreements.
The statute is not
mandatory, but merely permissive. Moreover, even assuming
two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to
cooperate in providing sewage services, the result would
not necessarily be greater competition.
Rather, the two
combined might well be more ~ul than either alone in
keeping other municipal~ties ~u~ ;~ the market.

~~

18.

at._~Hu-~~~
~..L~~~k._

d.L-~~~1-o -6-e,~ ~ lJ-e.
~ t.-1-

analysis
that

of

the

c.h.4..;-

1/V

City

of

statutes

Hr-t.l-

Lafayette,

s8m1

supra,

the-- Seate-

it

is

sufficient

iRte-si3ea - the Gity--

~

to--..y-

~ ~_._, _ _ J

anticompetitive effects logically ~ result from ~~
.1\

~to

1\. regula \refl·
~

Co.,

439

displace

See New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin

u.s.
the

regulatory

96,

109

(1978)

(no

antitrust

laws,

but

structure

unfettered business

freedom").

Turner, Antitrust Law
Nor

do we

that

~212.3,

agree with

the

express

w.

Fox

intent

statute

to

provided

inherently

"displace[d)

Accord 1 P.

Areeda

&

D.

at 54 (Supp. 1982).
Towns'

contention

that

statutes at issue here are neutral on State policy.

the
The

~ J..t.-t J;
~

attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home

Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing
that the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave

19.

the City free to pursue either anticornpetitive conduct or
free-market cornpeti tion

in the field of sewage services.

The analogy to the Horne Rule Amendment involved in City of

~~ ~

Boulder

~ •. ~ ~

Colorado

is

~ Y.~.it I

Cj

)-1>

~~tv

~ ld

that

~ satisfy
~-

it

was

neutral

~q ~

(IPJv~

an ~

the "clear articulation"

the

the

general

most

regulation

~

con!le~uec..tl l)_

We

did

~state

7/u..~~

~~ test, b~•sat>se ~11 did

~~

only

to

Amendment

authority to rnunicipali ties to govern local affairs.

··~~
pv~~

()/ r

That

Constitu~ion ~located

~,,
~·

inapposite,( hev

of

cable

not

i"'

aA~a•pact

televis~n~

the municipality

wa~ free

Under

not

action

address

~

Horne

the
Rule

to decide every aspect

of policy relating to cable television, as well as policy

~··

relating
concern.

to

any

Here,

other
in

field

co~ast,

of

regulation

the

State

of

has

local

~

~~1-f,~
specifically J\ ir> He sla~ abou l;-- th& £e9"lalion

uy-

20.

sewerage
express

authority

to

delegated

has

and

services

to

ltt-he

the

1

take

action

result in anticompetitive effects.

that

foreseeably will

No reasonable argument

can be made that these statutes are neutral in the same
way that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was.
Nor does
leave

to

it help the Towns • claim that the statutes

the

City

sewerage services.

the

discretion

whether

to

provide

States must always be free to delegate

' s~~

authority to their political subdivisions.j '\ ASfS0'1::t::lng-a:s the

(

State authorize},f

u~ ,

~ C)\ty, as a matter of state policy, to

a eot -i"fl.....j n .tl:te fie ld -of prov id~ sewage services and to
~

laws under the state action exemption.

l

21.

The
pass

Towns'

the

argument

"clear

articulation"

expressly

state

that

intends

it

in a

test,

statute or

for

the

effects.

anticompetitive

to

amounts
a

legislature

its legislative history

delegated
This

must

action

contention

~~....,a

, , ·t

11

to

embodies

have
an

c;;::: ~
~

unrealistic view of how legislatures worJ;t A ~· legislature

can be expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects
of

0-.-

~kh
of ~ ~
~:......-------------____,
Jaw.
MsrQ.Ove~
_ equiring
such
explicit

ever.:.JZ

authorization

by

the

State

would

be

unwise.

Justice

Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette was concerned that
th~ur:;,i ty'

d

ve*'¥

s

requirement

opinion
on

impose

this

detrimental

side

;... 71!----Gase would

legislatures,

with

-1

has never

h

ex~~it di£ect ~

22.

yA

-o

W1

~equir ~

such

a

close

examination

of

State

legislative

+v~~

intent in order to decide if the federal anti trust laws
-'\

apply ) pote z: iaHy

would

embroil

the

federal

courts

in

d~t~~~e'{/::c;-~~ental
a~

thwart

Besides unnecessarily burdening the courts, it would
the

fundamental

action doctrine of
antitrust

policy

scrutiny.

Towns

Parker

and

the

state

immunizing state action from federal
See

1

P.

Antitrust Law, supra, §212.3(b)
The

of

Of>!>ett.eJ.C?.:[

Areeda

& D.

Turner,

(Supp. 1982).

a~~at

the

"clear

1-(..l~t-

articulation"

~

of the state action test requires at

""'
least that the City show that the State "compelled" it to
act.

In

so doing,

Detroit Edison Co.,

they
428

rely

u.s.

on
579

language

in Cantor

v.

(1976), and Goldfarb v.

23.

Virginia State Bar, 421
this

contention for

the

private

state

action

We disagree with

773 (1975).

several reasons.

Goldfarb concerned
claiming

u.s.

E-irs&,

Cantor

),

and

parties--not municipalities--

~~~-~~

exemption,~

J;zm

=.t.he

are

cases

/\

~~~

--on

d± st~bte

'?

See supra,
case

/

.1\

u4~

at 27.

private

today,

W-e.-

~/~L

Southern

?L-Ot~

party

is ) Ft&t

~~~
sue~eeg

in a

~~

municipality,

:7

Motor

u.s.

Conference, Inc. v. United States,
a

a

sinee

f"JA-\.~

.~

SQcond_,_/(we have concluded in another

~
,;

decided

grou~

that

def~nse

requir M

to

Carriers

__,

Rate

that even

show compulsion

?If"
(/)1-~

state action QX8mption.

---rr-

24.

that the private party's anticompetitive
undertaken pursuant to State policy.
th~t

Even if we were to require a private party to show
the State compelled it to act, however,
a

requirement

as

unnecessary

where

the

actor

is

----------·---------------

None of our cases involving the application
of

the

state

action

exemption

to

required that compulsion be shown.
Lafayette

and

City

of

Boulder

a

municipality

has

Rathe!=-,. .lo th City of

spoke

in

terms

of

the

State's direction or authorization of the anticompetitive
practice at issue.

City of Boulder, supra, at 56-57; City

of Lafayette, supra, at 416-417.

This is so because where

the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly
articulated

state

policy,

compulsion

is

simply

25.

unnecessary, as an evidentiary matter,

to prove that the

challenged practice constitutes state action.

~

compulsio~may

although
it

is

by

no

means

a

6-<::.~~~--~
of --t he "clea rt2.
."\

-,

~t.

J .... £?<-~ ~~

evidence of State policy,

prerequisite

satisfacti on
state

rl6t.A.*f

s~ ~9od

In short,
~

~~'L

to

a _.{ municipality ')_

"

articulat ~ " ~

IV
As

noted

above ,

although City of

Lafayette

suggested

show that its anticompetitive conduct was
actively supervised by

the

State before

it could obtain

exemption under the state action doctrine, that suggestion
was

contained

whole
parties

applied

in

a

the

in Midcal,

plurality

opinion.

supervision
supra,

but

The

requirement
expressly

left

Court
to

as

a

private

the

issue

open as to municipalities in City of Boulder, supra.

We

26 •

.
~
t(
requ1remen

~

rl.-./1! 4 .,.....,.,..C,..iJI•rshould

not

~he

,.;

I

actor
I

is a

l

munici

Like the compulsion requirement discussed above, the'

requirement of active state supervision serves essentially)
an evidentiary
the actor
to

State

funct ~t

is engaging
policy.

is one way of ensuring that

in the challenged conduct pursuant

In Midcal,

we

stated

that

the

active

state supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a
State from circumventing
"by casting a .
what
445

• • gauzy cloak of state involvement over

is essentially a

u.s.,

at 106.

the Sherman Act's proscriptions

private price-fixing arrangement."

Where the actor is not a private party,

~trY-~

but a municipality, however, there is

~is involvedj'i&~ ~ivate

n9

danger that

1\

price-fixing arrangement.

wfiat7~

27.

As a creation of the State, organized for the purpose
of

executing

delegated

State

functions,

municipalities

stand in an inherently different relationship to the State
than do private parties.

As long as the municipality is

acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to
displace competition,

as

it is here,

there is no need to

require state supervision to be sure either that a state
policy is at work or that the power delegated by the State
is not being abused.

Where a private party is engaging in

the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that
he is acting to further his own interests, rather than the
governmental interests of the State.

State supervision is

therefore required to ensure that the delegated power is
not

being

abused.

Municipalities,

on

the

other

hand,

share the State's interest in furthering public goals; the

28.

only

real

danger

is

that

a

municipality

will

seek

to

further purely parochial interests at the expense of more
overriding State goals.

This danger is minimal, however,

because of the requirement that the municipality be acting
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.
is

established

that

the

particular

actions

in

Once it
question

were authorized by such a state policy, there is no need
to

require

the

State

to

supervise

actively

the

municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated
function.
In

addition

to

being

unnecessary,

we

believe

that

requiring states to supervise municipal conduct actively
would be unwise.

Wisconsin, like many other states, has a

tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities
to

regulate

a

wide

range

of

matters

of

largely

local

29.

concern.

See Town of Hallie v.

Ci tv of Chippewa Falls,

105 Wis.2d 533, 539, 314 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1982).
necessary

to

accomplish

efficient

and

effective

To require active supervision by

government.

This is
local

the

State

would erode local autonomy and hobble the State's ability
to
Yet,

focus

on more general matters

the

broaden

absence
the

scope

of
of

such

close

the

state

of

statewide concern.

supervision
action

will

not

exemption.

By

requiring that a municipality's action be authorized by a
clearly articulated state policy, we may be certain that
state action, and not purely local interests, are at work.
This remains true to the fundamental principle of Parker
v.

Brown,

while permitting

state functions.

necessary delegation of

some

30.

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire
in this case were taken pursuant to a clearly articulated
state policy
sewerage

to

replace competition in

services

with

regulation.

the provision of

Finding

no

need

to

require the State to supervise the City's execution of its
delegated functions, we accordingly affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
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This

case

presents

the

question

whether

a

municipality's anticompetitive activities are protected by

2.

the state action exemption to the federal anti trust laws

u.s.

established by Parker v. Brown, 317

341 (1943), when

the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the
State,

and

the

State

does

not

actively

supervise

the

anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners--Town of Hallie,
Union,

and

Wisconsin
City

of

Town

of

townships
Eau

Town of Seymour,

Washington
located

Claire

(the

(the

Town of

"Towns")--are

adjacent

to

respondent,

Town

"City").

four

of

the

Hallie

is

located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are
located

in

Eau

Claire

County. 1

The

Towns

filed

suit

against the City in United States District Court for the

1 The City
Counties.

is

located

in

both

Eau

Claire

and

Chippewa

3.

Western District of Wisconsin

seeking

injunctive

relief

and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act,

u.s.c.

§1

et

seq.,

by

acquiring

a

monopoly

over

15

the

provision of sewage treatment services in Eau Claire and
Chippewa
services

Counties,
to

transportation

the

and

by

provision

.
2
serv1ces.

Pollution Control Act, 33
had

obtained

treatment

tying

federal

facility

of

u.s.c.

the

provision

sewage

Under

funds

within

the

of

such

collection

and

Federal

the

Water

§§1151, et seq., the City

to
Eau

help

build

Claire

a

Service

sewage
Area,

which included the Towns; the facility is the only one in
the market available to the Towns.

2

The City has refused

The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 u.s.c. §§1151, et seq.,
and of a common law duty of a utility to serve.
The
district court dismissed these claims, and they are not at
issue in this Court.

to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does
supply the services to

and to use the City's sewage collection and transportation

competitors
City in the collection and transportation of sewage,

the

Towns contended in the District Court that the City used
its monopoly
monopoly

over

over

the

sewage

treatment

provision

transportation services,

of

to gain

sewage

an

unlawful

collection

and

in violation of the Sherman Act.

They also contended that the City's actions constituted an
illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal
with the Towns.

5.
;

The District Court ruled for

the City.

It found that

Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of
sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace

*-?

~
competition with regulation.r;he court also found that the
State

adequately

supervised

the

municipality's

conduct

through the State Department of Natural Resources,
was

authorized

to

~
~h

review municipal decisions concerning

provision of sewage services and corresponding annexations
of land.

The court concluded that the City's allegedly

anticompetitive

conduct

fell

within

the

state

action

exemption to the federal antitrust laws, as set forth in
Community Communications Co. v.C
~~i~t~v~o~f~=B~o~u~l~d~e~r~, 455

u.s.

Ac.ccJnli~tsl'j 1
40

(1982), and Parker v. Brown, supra.

complaint.

;1

.l't dismissed the

6.

The

United

States

Circuit affirmed.
the

Wisconsin

Court

of

Appeals

for

700 F.2d 376 (CA7 1983).

statutes

authorized

the

the

Seventh

It ruled that

City

to

provide

sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to
The

unincorporated

areas.

the

contemplated

State

had

court

therefore

that

assumed

anticompeti tive

that

effects

The City's conduct thus constituted state

might result.

action within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra.

The

court also concluded that in a case such as this involving
"a

local

government

performing

a

traditional

municipal

function," 700 F.2d, at 384, active state supervision was
unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply.
supervision as

a prerequisite

unwise in this situation,
would

erode

traditional

Requiring such

to immunity would also be

the court believed, because it
concepts

of

local

autonomy

and

7.

home

rule

that

were

clearly

expressed

in

the

u.s.

(1984),

state's

statutes.
We

granted

certiorari,

and

now

affirm.
II
The starting point in any analysis involving the state
action doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown.
Parker,

relying

on

principles

of

federalism

and

In

state

sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act
as

applying

acting

to

through

Rather,

it

the
its

ruled

anticompeti tive
legislature.

that

the

317

Sherman

conduct

of

a

u.s.,

at

350-351.

Act was

intended

to

it refused

to

prohibit private

restraints on

trade,

infer

to

state's control over

an

intent

"nullify a

and

State

its

8.

officers

and

agents"

in

activities

directed

by

the

legislature.
Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on
the other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust
laws

by

virtue

themselves

of

their

sovereign.

Power & Light Co.,

435

status

City

u.s.

of

because

they

Lafayette

v.

389,

412

are

not

Louisiana

(1978).

Rather,

to

obtain exemption, political subdivisions must demonstrate

~~
that their anticompetitive activities were d4rectQd by the
1\.

State

"pursuant

to state policy

to displace

with regulation or monopoly public service."
(opinion

of

municipality

J.).

BRENNAN,
that

its

Thus,

a

competition
Id., at 413

showing

anticompetitive

by

the

activities

~~,~~~L...,~~~
oeRstit.y,.t.e.

•t.at.Q... ae l:"i-ei1
A

Sherman Act liability.

entitles

it

to

exemption

from

)./"

9.

constitute
inquiry:

state
the

that

a

municipality's

action

is

not

State

anticompetitive

may

conduct

not

a

purely

validate

simply

by

activities

a

formalistic

municipality's

declaring

it

to

be

~

lawful.
of

Lafayette

must

Rather, the City

Parker v. Brown, supra, at 351.
plurality

establish

articulated

that

and

it

-1

acted

pursuant

affirmatively

municipality

the

concluded ) ~

to

a

"clearly
state

expressed

Ht..~f-

policy" wl:H:eh was "actively supervised" by the State, 435

u.s.,

at

410.

able

to

point

authorization"

The

municipality

to
in

a

order

need

specific,
to

defense to an antitrust suit.

assert

not,

detailed
a

however,

"be

legislative

successful

Parker

*

Id., at 415./The plurality

viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed]
to the States their freedom to administer state regulatory

+./7

10.

policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust
laws without at the same time permitting purely parochial
interests

to

disrupt

the

Nation's

free-market

goals."

!d., at 415-416.
In

California

Midcal

Aluminum,

Retail
Inc.,

Liquor

u.s.

445

Dealers
97

Association

(1980),

a

v.

unanimous

Court applied the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a
case in which the state action exemption was claimed by a
private

In

party.

immunity

for

there

resale

liquor

was

entitled

to

a

clear

price

supervision of
wine

case,

California's

though

private

that

the

wine

legislative

anticompeti ti ve

state

who

found

pricing

maintenance,

producers
the

we

set

action

no

was

activity.

resale

exemption.

Even

system.

policy

there

antitrust

prices
When

to

permit

no

state

Thus,

the

were

not

we

again

11.

addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust

laws

in

declined to apply
held

City

"

supra,

Boulder,

~
~ y the City

Colorado's

that

of

of Lafayette test.

We

to

Amendment

Rule

Home

l1owa - : we

its

Constitution, conferring on municipal governments general
authority to govern local affairs, did not constitute a
"clear

articulation"

of

a

state

policy

to

authorize

anticompetitive conduct with respect to the regulation of
cable

television

not meet

this

declined

to

municipality

in the

locale.

requirement of
decide

whether
also

must

Because the city could

the state action test,
governmental
the

satisfy

supervision" component of the test.
It

is

therefore

municipality will

be

clear

from

entitled

"active

by

a

state

Id., at 51-52, n. 14.

our
to

action

we

cases

the

that

before

protection of

a

the

12.

state

action

exemption

to

the

anti trust

laws,

it

must

demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity
pursuant

to

never fully

a

clearly

expressed /tate

policy.

We

have

~~
a~dressee, however, how clearly a state policy
1

must be articulated for a municipality to be able to say
that

its

action.

anticompeti ti ve
Moreover,

we

activity

have

constitutes

expressly

left

open

state
the

whether action by a municipality--like action
by

a

private

party--must

supervision" requirement.
52, n. 14.

satisfy

the

"active

state

City of Boulder, supra, at 51-

We consider both of those issues below.

III

13.

-

The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code
to support

its claim that

its

allegedly anticompeti ti ve

activity constitutes state action.

We

therefore examine

the statutory structure in some detail.
A

Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.18(1) grants authority to cities to
construct,
The

add

authority

reasonable

to,

alter,

includes

particularity

and
the
the

repair
power

sewerage
to

district

systems.

"describe
to

be

with

[served]

0

n

This grant of authority is supplemented by §66.069(2) (c),
providing that a city .operating a public utility
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service
in unincorporated areas.
Such ordinance shall
delineate the area within which service will be
provided and the municipal utility shall have no
obligation
to
serve
beyond
the
area
so
delineated."
With

respect

provides

that

to
the

joint

sewerage

systems,

State'.s Department of

§144.07(1)

Natural Resources

/h,cl.

14.

may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so
that

other

cities,

towns,

or

areas

may

connect

to

the

system, and the Department may order that such connections
be made.

Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order

by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection
of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void
if that territory refuses to become annexed to the

city ~

B

The

Towns contend

that

these

statutory provisions do

not evidence a state policy to displace competition in the
provision of sewage services because they make no express
mention of anticompetitive

conduct~

As discussed above,

~ ~The

Towns 1 also rely on §§66. 076 ( 1) and 66.30 of the
Wisconsin cbde to argue that the State's policy on the ~
provision Of sewage services is actually procompeti ti ve.
This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not
Footnote continued on next page.

CotA.~ ~ ~ ~ 'Def~
c.V: \ ~~ -\..A.-.> ~ ~ •
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15.

the statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in
anticompeti ti ve

conduct.

Such

conduct

is

a

foreseeable

result of empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed
areas.
jtate

It is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the
legislature

expected

the

City

to

have

to engage

anticompetitive effects.

stated

explicitly

in conduct

that

that would

it
have

Applying the analysis of City of

UA-~

~

support the co tention. First, it is true that §66.076(1) ~
permits
municipalities, including towns, to
_ j
operate sewage syste
The rov' ·
is simply a general~~~
enabling statute,
owever, not a mandatory prescription.
In addition, subse
of §66.076 incorporates into
the enabling statute all of the limitations of §66.069,
including the power to limit the area of service.
Thus,
§66.076(1)
does
not
express
a
procompetitive
state
attitude.
Nor does §66.30 aid the Towns.
It is a general
provision concerning all utilities--not just sewerage
systems--that
permits
municipalities
to
enter
into
cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but
merely
permissive.
Moreover,
even
assuming
two
municipalities
agreed
pursuant
to
this
section
to
cooperate in providing sewage services, the result would
not necessarily be greater competition.
Rather, the two
combined might well be more effective than either alone in
keeping other municipalities out of the market.

16.

Lafayette,

supra,

it

is

sufficient

that

the

statutes

authorized the City to provide sewage services and also to
determine the areas to be served.

We think it is clear

that anticompeti ti ve effects logically would
this broad authority to regulate.
Board v.

Orrin

w.

Fox Co.,

439

result from

See New Motor Vehicle

u.s.

96,

109

(1978}

(no

express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d]
unfettered

business

freedom"} •

Turner, Antitrust Law
Nor

do we

~212.3,

agree with

the

Accord) 1 P.

Areeda

t

o.

at 54 (Supp. 1982}.
Towns'

contention

that

statutes at issue here are neutral on /tate policy.

Towns~attempt

&

the
The

to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home

Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing
that the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave

I
~

17.

the City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or
free-market competition in the field of sewage services.
The analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of
Boulder

is

inapposite.

That

Amendment

to

the

Color ado

Constitution allocated only the most general authority to
municipalities to govern local affairs.

We held that it

was neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation"
component of the state action test.

The Amendment simply

did not address the regulation of cable television.

Under

Home Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every
aspect of policy relating to cable television, as well as
policy relating to any other field of regulation of local
concern.

Here,

in contrast,

the

State has

authorized Wisconsin cities to provide

specifically

sew~e

services

and has delegated to the cities the express authority to

18.

take

action

that

anticompeti ti ve

foreseeably

effects.

No

will

reasonable

result

in

argument can

be

made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that

was. ~~

Colorado's Home Rule Amendment
The
pass

Towns'

the

argument

"clear

articulation"

expressly state
that

it

in a

intends

anticompetitive
unrealistic

~ 14 Nor

all

of

the

effects.

view

of

the

to

how

a

test,

statute or

for

statutes are written.
catalog

amounts

contention
a

to

legislature must

its legislative history

delegated
This

that

action

contention

legislatures

work

to

embodies
and

of

have
an
how

No legislature can be expected to

anticipated effects of a

statute of

does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes
to the City the discretion whether to provide
sew~ge services.
States must always be free to delegate d(
authority to their political subdivisions.
leave

~

19.

this kind.
Furthermore,

requiring

such explicit authorization by

the State would be unwise.
City

of

opinion

Lafayette
would

never

local

435

\!:1 fi Requir i_ng 5

autonomy

u.s.,

required

Towns insist is

this

kind

detrimental

with

municipalities'

has

concerned

impose

legislatures,

themselves.

was

Justice Stewart's dissent in

the

and

at 434-435.
degree

of

that

the

plurality's

of

requirement

side

effects

authority
This

to

on
upon

govern

Cour ~ ~

specificity

that

the

necessary. -~

A

such
a
close
examination
of c:t. tate
intent to determine whether
the federal
antitrust laws apply would be undesirable also because it
would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary
interpretation of state statutes.
Besides burdening the
courts, it would thwart the fundamental policy of Parker
and the state action doctrine of immunizing state act1on
from federal anti trust scrutiny.
See 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, §212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).
legislat~'

20.

In

~)
~t,

evidence
expressed"

a

we

conclude

"clearly
state

policy

that

the

articulated
to

displace

Wisconsin
and

statutes

affirmatively

competition

with

regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage
services.
"the

These

statutory provisions

legislature

contemplated

the

plainly
kind

show
of

that

action

~
complained of." / City of Lafayette, supra, at 415. i)/ This

\JI'four view of the legislature's intent is supported by
Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2d 533,
314 N.W.2d 321 (1982), in which the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge under
state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in
a case quite similar to the one at bar.
There, the Town
of Hallie argued that the City's refusal to provide it
with
sewage
treatment
services,
the
requirement of
annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision
of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage
collection and other city services, violated the state
antitrust laws.
The state supreme court disagreed,
concluding that the legislature intended the City to
undertake the challenged actions.
Those actions would
therefore be be exempt from the state's anti trust laws.
Analysing
§§66. 069 ( 2) (c)
and
144.07 (1m) ,
the
court
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by
the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a
reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before
extending sewer services to the area."
Id., at 540-541,
Footnote continued on next page.

21.

sufficient

is

satisfy

to

clear

the

articulation

requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further
requirement

of

the

argue that the "clear articulation"
state

action

test

requires

at

least

that the City show that the State "compelled" it to act.
In so doing,

they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit

Edison Co., 428

u.s.

579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia

State

u.s.

773

Bar,

421

contention

for

concerned

several

private

(1975).
reasons.

parties--not

We disagree with
Cantor

and

this

Goldfarb

municipalities--claiming

314 N.W.2d, at 325.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does
not, of course, decide the question presented here 1 ~he
City's immunity under the federal anti trust laws, it is
instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal
provision of sewerage services.

t

22.

the state action exemption.

This fact distinguishes those

cases because a municipality is an arm of the state.
may presume,

absent a

municipality

acts

private party,

showing

to the contrary,

~ Jt~ public

on the other hand,

We

that the

~ri:.

interest ... at

A

may be presumed to be

crf-,hacting primarily on his own behalf.
\.

See

infra,

at

Also, as we have concluded in another case decided today,
Southern Motor

Carriers

u.s.

States,

__,

Rate Conference,

a

private party

Inc.

is not

v.

United

invariably

required to show compulsion where the state authorization
or approval is clear.
None

of

our

cases

involving

the

application

of

the

state action exemption to a municipality has required that
compulsion be shown.
,~, ~t
Boulder spoke in
A,

/~ ' u.t- 5"'/..

-S'"

Both City of Lafayette and City of

1./tC ~ '/17
terms

of

J

the

State's

direction

or

23.

authorization of

a municipality,
state

policy,

evidentiary

the

anticompetitive

practice

at

issue.

acting pursuant to a clearly articulated
compulsion

mat~

is

simply

unnecessar~

as

an

to prove that the challenged practice
although compulsion

constitutes state action.

In short,

affirmatively

g~siv~

expressed

is

evidence

of

state

policy, it is by no means a prerequisite to a finding that
a municipality acted pursuant to clearly articulated state
policy.

IV
Finally,

the Towns argue that as

state supervision,
action exemption.

there was no active

the City may not depend on the state
The Towns rely primarily on language in

24.

City of Lafayette.

It is fair to say that our cases have

not been entirely clear.
Lafayette

did

say,

The plurality opinion in City of

without

elaboration,

that

a

city

claiming the exemption must show that its anticompetitive
conduct was actively supervised by the State.
at 410.

435

u.s.,

In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association

v. Midcal, 445

u.s.

97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that

supervision is required where the anticompetitive conduct
is by private parties.

In City of Boulder, however, the

most recent relevant case,
open

as

to

municipalities.

we expressly left this
We

now

conclude

that

issue
the

active state supervision requirement should not be imposed
in cases in which the actor is a municipality.
As

with respect

above, see supra, at

to

the compulsion argument discussed

__,

the requirement of active state

25.

supervision

serves

essentially

an

evidentiary

it is one way of ensuring that the actor
the

challenged

Midcal,

we

conduct

stated

requirement

was

pursuant

that

the

necessary

to

active
to

function:

is engaging

State

policy.

state

prevent

a

in
In

supervision
State

from

circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by casting

a

gauzy

essentially
U.S.,

a

at 106.

cloak of

state

involvement over

what

private

price-fixing

Where a

private party is engaging in the

anticompetitive activity,

arrangement."

is

there is a real danger

445

that he

~ ISk+f
is acting

to further

his ,1-own

interests,

governmental interests of the State.
not a private party, but a
little

or

no

danger

that

price-fixing arrangement.

rather

than the

Where the actor is

municipality~howeve ~

it

is

involved

in

a

there is
private

The only real danger is that it

26.

will seek to further purely parochial public interests at
the expense of more overriding /tate goals.

This danger

is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the
municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy.
there

Once it is clear that state authorization exists,
is

actively

no
the

need

to

require

municipality's

properly delegated

the

State

execution

of

to

supervise

what

is

a

function. ~
v

We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire

~·In

~

addition to being unnecessary, requiring states
to supervise municipal conduct actively wou d be unwise.
Wisconsin, like many other states, has a
radition of
delegating broad authority to municipalities t
regulate a
wide range of matters of largely local concer .
See Town
of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2 533, 539,
314 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1982). To require active upervision
by the State would erode local autonomy and -R-ebble the
State's ability to focus on more general matters of
statewide concern.

27.

d.£;~~

UL

~
"3~ dJ--.1

in this case1 were taken pursuant to a clearly articulated
state policy
sewerage

to replace competition in the provision of

services
the

w.i th

State

to

regulation.

supervise

~

-

Finding

the

City's

no

need

execution

accordingly

affirm

the

judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
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Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no
active state supervision, the City may not rely on the
state action exemption.

Reliance by the Towns is placed

primarily on language in City of Lafayette.

It is fair to

say that our cases have not been entirely clear.

The

plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did say, without
elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption must show
that its anti-competitive conduct was actively supervised
by the State.

In Midcal, a unanimous Court held that

supervision is required where the anti-competitive conduct
is by private parties.

In City of Boulder, however, the

most recent relevant case, we expressly left this issue
open as to municipalities.

We now conclude that the

2.

active state supervision requirement should not be imposed
in cases in which the actor is a municipality.
As with respect to the compulsion argument
discussed above, the requirement of active state
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function:
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THE

UNITED
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COURT

OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[December

__,

1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This

case

presents

the

question

whether

a

municipality's anticompetitive activities are protected by

2.

the state action exemption to the federal anti trust laws

u.s.

established by Parker v. Brown, 317

341 (1943), when

the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the
State,

and

the

State

does

not

actively

supervise

the

anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners--Town of Hallie,
Union,

and

Wisconsin
City

of

Town

of

townships
Eau

Town of Seymour,

Washington
located

Claire

(the

(the

Town of

"Towns")--are

adjacent

to

respondent,

Town

"City").

four

of

the

Hallie

is

located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are
located

in

Eau

Claire

County. 1

The

Towns

filed

suit

against the City in United States District Court for the

1 The

City
Counties.

is

located

in

both

Eau

Claire

and

Chippewa

3.

Western

District of Wisconsin

and alleging

u.s.c.

§1

seeking

that the City violated

et

seq.,

by

acquiring

injunctive

relief

the Sherman Act,
a

monopoly

over

15
the

provision of sewage treatment services in Eau Claire and
Chippewa
services

Counties,
to

transportation

the

and

by

provision

services. 2

Pollution Control Act, 33
had

obtained

treatment

tying

federal

facility

of

funds
the

provision

sewage

Under

u.s.c.

within

the

of

such

collection

and

Federal

the

Water

/;}.S/
§§~,

to
Eau

help

et seq., the City
build

Claire

a

Service

sewage
Area,

which included the Towns; the facility is the only one in
the market available to the Towns.

2

The City has refused

~

The complaint also alleged violations of:Jt-he Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ffi.h et seq.,
and of a common law duty of a utility to serve.
The
district court dismissed these claims, and they are not at
issue in this Court.

4.

to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of
the

Towns

if a majority of

the

individuals

in the area

vote by referendum election to have their homes annexed by
the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann. §§66.024(4}, 144.07(1}, and
to

use

the

City's

sewage

collection

and

transportation

services.
Alleging

that

they

are

potential

competitors

of

the

City in the collection and transportation of sewage,

the

Towns contended in the District Court that the City used
its monopoly
monopoly

over

over
the

sewage

treatment

provision

of

to gain an

sewage

unlawful

collection

and

transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act.
They also contended that the City's actions constituted an

5.

illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal
with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for

the City.

It found that

Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of
sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace
competition with

regulation.

The court also found

that

the State adequately supervised the municipality's conduct
=11=through

the~tate

authorized

to

Department of Natural Resources, thafs
review

municipal

decisions

concerning

provision of sewage services and corresponding annexations
of land.

The court concluded that the City's allegedly

anticompetitive

conduct

fell

within

the

state

action

exemption to the federal antitrust laws, as set forth in
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455

u.s.

/

6.

40

(1982),

and

Parker

v.

Brown,

supra.

Accordingly,

it

dismissed the complaint.
The

United

States

Circuit affirmed.
the

Wisconsin

Court

of

Appeals

for

700 F.2d 376 (CA7 1983).

statutes

authorized

the

the

Seventh

It ruled that

City

to

provide

sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to
unincorporated
the

areas.

The

State had contemplated

might result.

court

therefore

that

assumed

anticompeti tive

that

effects

The City's conduct thus constituted state

action within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra.

The

court also concluded that in a case such as this involving
"a

local

government

performing

a

traditional

municipal

function," 700 F.2d, at 384, active state supervision was
unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply.
supervision as a prerequisite

Requiring such

to immunity would also be

7.

unwise in this situation,
would
home

erode
rule

traditional
that

were

the court believed, because it
concepts

clearly

of

local

autonomy

expressed

in

the

u.s.

(1984) ,

and

state's

statutes.
We

granted

certiorari,

and

now

affirm.
II

The starting point in any analysis involving the state
action doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown.
Parker,

relying

on

principles

of

federalism

and

In

state

sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act
as

applying

acting
Rather,

to

through
it

the
its

ruled

prohibit private

anticompeti tive
legislature.

that

the

317

Sherman

restraints on

conduct

of

u.s.,

at

Act was

trade,

and

a

State

350-351.

intended

to

it refused to

8.

infer

an

intent

officers

and

legislature.

to "nullify a state's control over its

agents"

~

in

activities

L/. 1 J-

directed

by

the

3SI.

Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on
the other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust
laws

by

virtue

themselves

of

their

sovereign.

status

because

they

;:::C..::::i-::t~v-~o~f=---....:L:=;a=f.!::ac...~..v...::e:...!t::....:t~e=-

v.

are

Louisiana

( op ,-.,..,Ov'l () 1-

Power

&

Light Co.,

435 U.S.

389,

412

not

~"'"'~"}

Rather, to

(1978y.

obtain exemption, political subdivisions must demonstrate
that their anticompetitive activities were authorized by
the

State

"pursuant

to

state

policy

to

displace

competition with regulation or monopoly public service."
7

Id., at 413 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.).

Thus, a showing by

the municipality that its anticompetitive activities were

"\

:J. J

9.

duly authorized by the State entitles it to exemption from
Sherman Act liability.
The

determination

constitute
inquiry;

state
the

action

State

anticompetitive

that

may

conduct

a

municipality's

is

not

not

a

purely

validate

simply

by

Parker v.

Brown,

City of

Lafayette

plurality concluded,

establish

articulated
policy"

that

and

it

a

supra, at 351.

acted

affirmatively

formalistic

municipality's

declaring

lawful.

must

activities

it

to

Rather, as the
the

pursuant

municipality

to

a

"clearly
state

expressed

that was "actively supervised" by the State,

u.s.,

at

410.

able

to

point

authorization"

The

municipality

to
in

a

order

need

specific,
to

defense to an antitrust suit.

assert

not,

detailed
a

be

however,

"be

legislative

successful

Id., at 415.

435

Parker

The plurality

10.

viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed]
to the States their

state regulatory

policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust
laws without at the same time permitting purely parochial
interests

to

disrupt

the

Nation's

free-market

goals."

Id., at 415-416.
In

California

Midcal

Aluminum,

Retail
Inc.,

Liquor
445

u.s.

Dealers
97

(1980),

a

unanimous

Court applied the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a
case in which the state action exemption was claimed by a
private

party.

immunity
though
resale

for

there

In

that

California's
was

liquor

supervision of

a

clear

price
the

case,

we

wine

found

pricing

legislative

maintenance,

anticompeti ti ve

no

Even

system.

policy

there

antitrust

was

activity.

to

permit

no
Thus,

state
the

11.

private

wine

entitled

to

producers
the

state

who

set

action

resale

prices

exemption.

were

When

we

not

again

addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the

~
antitrust laws

in City of Boulder,

supra, we declined to

apply literally the City of Lafayette test.
Colorado's

Home

Rule

Amendment

to

its

We held that
Constitution,

conferring on municipal governments general authority
govern

local

affairs,

articulation"

of

a

did

not

state

constitute
policy

to

a

to ·

"clear

authorize

anticompetitive conduct with respect to the regulation of
cable
not

television

meet

declined

this
to

municipality

in

the

locale.

requirement of
decide
must

whether
also

Because

the City could

the state action
governmental

satisfy

the

test,

action
"active

by

we
a

state

LJc;::> l). 5.,
supervision" component of the test.

~at 51-52,

n. 14.

I

12.

It

is

therefore

municipality
state

will

action

be

clear

from

entitled

exemption

to

our
to

the

cases

the

that

before a

protection of

anti trust

laws,

it

the
must

demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity
pursuant
never

to

fully

a

clearly expressed

considered,

state

policy.

We

how

clearly

a

however,

have
state

policy must be articulated for a municipality to be able
to say that its anticompetitive activity constitutes state
action.

Moreover,

we

have

expressly

left

open

the

question whether action by a municipality--like action by
a

private

party--must

supervision" requirement.
52, n. 14.

satisfy

the

"active

state

City of Boulder, supra, at 51-

We consider both of those issues below.

13.

III
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code
to

support

its claim that

its

allegedly anticompeti tive

activity constitutes state action.

We

therefore examine

the statutory structure in some detail.
A

Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.18(1) grants authority to cities to
construct,
The

add

authority

reasonable
Ibid.

to,

alter,

includes

particularity

This

§66.069(2) (c),

grant

of

providing

and
the
the

repair
power

to

district

authority
that

sewerage

a

is

systems.

"describe
to

be

with

[served]."

supplemented

city operating

a

by

public

utility
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service
in unincorporated areas.
Such ordinance shall

14.

delineate the area within which service will be
provided and the municipal utility shall have no
obligation
to
serve
beyond
the
area
so
delineated."
With

respect

to

joint

sewerage

systems,

§144.07(1)

provides that the State's Department of · Natural Resources
may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so
that

other

cities,

towns,

or

areas

may

connect

to

the

system, and the Department may order that such connections
be made.

Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order

by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection
of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void
if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city.

3

B

The

3

Towns contend

that

these

statutory provisions do

There is no such order of the
Resources at issue in this case.

Department

of

Natural

15.

not evidence a state policy to displace competition in the
provision of sewage services because they make no express
mention of anticompetitive conduct.

4

As discussed above,

the statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in
anticompeti ti ve

conduct.

Such

conduct

is

a

foreseeable

4 The Towns also rely on §§66.076(1) and 66.30 of the
Wisconsin code to argue that the State's policy on the
provision of sewage services is actually procompeti ti ve.
This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not
support the contention. First, it is true that §66.076(1)
permits
certain
municipalities,
including
towns,
to
operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general
enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription.
In addition, subsection ( 8) of §66. 076 incorporates into
the enabling statute all of the limitations of §66. 069,
including the power to limit the area of service.
Thus,
§66.076(1)
does
not
express
a
procompetitive
state
attitude.
Nor does §66.30 aid the Towns.
It is a general
provision concerning all utilities--not just sewerage
systems--that
permits
municipalities
to
enter
into
cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but
merely
permissive.
Moreover,
even
assumin9
two
municipalities
agreed
pursuant
to
this
sect1on
to
cooperate in providing sewage services, the . result would
not necessarily be greater competition.
Rather, the two
combined might well be more effective than either alone in
keeping other municipalities out of the market.

16.

result of empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed
areas.
state

It is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the
legislature

expected

the

City

to

have

to engage

anticompetitive effects.
Lafayette,

supra,

stated

it

explicitly

in conduct

that

that would

it
have

Applying the analysis of City of
is

sufficient

that

the

statutes

authorized the City to provide sewage services and also to
determine the areas to be served.

We think it is clear

that anticompetitive effects logically would result from
this broad authority to regulate.
Board v.

Orrin

w.

Fox Co.,

439

See New Motor Vehicle

u.s.

96,

109

(1978)

(no

express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d]
unfettered business freedom").
Turner, Antitrust Law

~212.3,

Accord,

1 P.

Areeda

at 54 (Supp. 1982).

&

D.

17.

Nor

do we

agree with

the Towns'

contention that the

statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy.

The

Towns attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home
Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing
that the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave
the City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or
free-market competition in the field of sewage services.
The analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of
Boulder

is

inapposite.

That

Amendment

to

the

Colorado

Constitution allocated only the most general authority to
municipalities to govern local affairs.

We held that it

was neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation"
component of the state action test.

The Amendment simply

did not address the regulation of cable television.

Under

Home Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every

18.

aspect of policy relating to cable television, as well as
policy relating to any other field of regulation of local
Here,

concern.

in contrast,

the State has specifically

authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage services and
has delegated to the cities the express authority to take
action

that

effects.

foreseeably

No reasonable

will

result

in

anticompetitive

argument can be made that these

statutes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home
Rule Amendment was. 5
The
pass

Towns'

the

expressly

argument

"clear
state

amounts

articulation"
in a

to

a

test,

statute or

contention
a

that

to

legislature must

its legislative history

5
Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes
leave to the City the discretion whether to provide sewage
services.
States must always be free to delegate such
authority to their political subdivisions.

19.

that

it

intends

anticompetitive
unrealistic

for

the

effects.

view

of

catalog

all

of

This

how

statutes are written.

delegated

action

contention

legislatures

to

have

embodies

work

and

an

of

how

No legislature can be expected to

the anticipated effects of a

statute of

this kind.
Furthermore,

requiring

such explicit authorization by

the State would be unwise.
City

of

opinion

Lafayette
would

impose
with

legislatures,
municipalities'
themselves.

was

concerned
this

kind

detrimental

local

435

Justice Stewart's dissent in

u.s.,

autonomy

and

at 434-435.

that

the

plurality's

of

requirement

side

effects

authority

to

on
upon

govern

This Court has never

required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist
is necessary. 6

Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages.

20.

In

sum,

evidence
expressed"

a

we

conclude

"clearly
state

policy

that

the

Wisconsin

articulated
to

displace

and

statutes

affirmatively

competition

with

regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage
services.

'

"the

.A

These

statutory provisions

legislature

complained of!\'

''

contemplated

the

plainly
kind

show that
of

City of Lafayette, supra, at 415.1

/

action
7

This

.Jtc,·~;~

~~" ~~ur~.;; ",ft:;;/J..)1
6 )Z.

,.-.o-Q

,

)

6
Requiring
such
a
close
examination
of
a
state
legislature's intent to determine whether the federal
antitrust laws apply would be undesirable also because it
would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary
interpretation of state statutes.
Besides burdening the
courts, it would thwart the fundamental policy of Parker
and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action
from federal antitrust scrutiny.
See 1 P. Areeda & D.
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, §212.3(b) (Supp. 1982).

7our view of the legislature 1 s intent is supported by
Town of Hallie v. Cit{ of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2d 533,
314 N.W.2d 321 (198 ) , in which the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie 1 s challenge under
state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in
a case quite similar to the one at bar.
There, the Town
of Hallie argued that the City 1 s refusal to provide it
with
sewage
treatment
services,
the
requirement of
annexation, and the City 1 s conditioning of the provision
of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage
Footnote continued on next page.

21.

is

sufficient

to

satisfy

the

clear

articulation

requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further
requirement of

the

argue that the "clear articulation"
state

action

test

requires

at

least

that the City show that the State "compelled" it to act.
In so doing,

they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit

Edison Co., 428

u.s.

579 (1976}, and Goldfarb v. Virginia

collection and other city services, violated the state
antitrust laws.
The state supreme court disagreed,
concluding that the legislature intended the City to
undertake the challenged actions.
Those actions would
therefore be be exempt from the state's anti trust laws.
Analysing
§§66.069(2} (c)
and
144.07(lm},
the
court
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by
the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a
reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before
extending sewer services to the area."
Id., at 540-541,
314 N.W.2d, at 325.
-Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does
not, of course, decide the question presented here of the
City's immunity under the federal antitrust laws, it is
instructive on the question of the state legislature's
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal
provision of sewerage services.

22.

State

Bar ,

4 21

contention

for

concerned

U• S .

773

several

private

( 19 7 5 ) .

We disagree with

reasons.

parties--not

the state action exemption.

Cantor

and

Goldfarb

municipalities--claiming

This fact distinguishes those

cases because a municipality is an arm of the State.
may presume,

absent a

showing

municipality

acts

the

party,

on

in

the other

primarily on his or

hand,

this

to the contrary,

public

may be presumed

its own behalf.

that the
private

A

interest.

We

to be acting

infra, at

Also, as we have concluded in another case decided today,
Southern Motor
States,

Carriers

u.s. __,

Rate Conference,

Inc.

a private party is not

v.

United

invariably

required to show compulsion where the state authorization
or approval is clear.

23.

None

of

our

cases

involving

the

application

of

the

state action exemption to a municipality has required that

L/Ss US:.>

toul ti.£vcompulsion be

shown.

Both ~CJ,ij;~~y~oQ!f__:!L:!!a~f~a~·.~·e!tt~t~e,

J..« f,yd{e 45~
56-57 ,
terms

~CJ,ij;tj!Y~OQ.fL~B~e!!t:t~·l~d~e?.:f'~,,

and
of

the

State's

u.s.

~at

direction or

anticompetitive

practice

where the actor

is a municipality,

clearly

articulated

unnecessary

as

an

at

state

evidentiary

416-417 ,

This

is

compulsion

so

compulsion

matter

affirmatively

of

in
the

because

acting pursuant to a

to

prove

challenged practice constitutes state action.
although

spoke

authorization

issue.

policy,

~at

expressed

is

simply

that

the

In short,
is

good

evidence of state policy, it is by no means a prerequisite
to a finding that a municipality acted pursuant to clearly
articulated state policy.

IV

24.

Finally,

the Towns argue that as there was no active

state supervision,
action exemption.

the City may not depend on the state
The Towns rely primarily on language in

City of Lafayette.

It is fair to say that our cases have

not been entirely clear.
Lafayette

did

say,

The plurality opinion in City of

without

elaboration,

that

a

city

claiming the exemption must show that its anticompetitive
conduct was actively supervised by the State.
at 410.

435

u.s.,

In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assooiatirn

A-1 Ur"'i~ Ut"ls

I

v. Midcalt 445
I

,.., (. •

u.s.

97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that

supervision is required where the anticompetitive conduct
is by private parties.

In City of Boulder, however, the

most

recent

relevant case,

open

as

municipalities.

to

we expressly left this issue
We

now

conclude

that

the

25.

active state supervision requirement should not be imposed
in cases in which the actor is a municipality.
As

with

respect

to

__,

above, see supra, at
supervision
it

serves

the compulsion argument discussed
the requirement of active state

essentially

an

evidentiary

is one way of ensuring that the actor

the

challenged

Midcal,

we

conduct

stated

requirement

was

pursuant

that

the

necessary

to

active
to

is engaging in

State
state

prevent

function:

a

policy.

In

supervision
State

from

circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by casting
a

gauzy

essentially

u.s.,

a

at 106.

cloak

of

private
Where a

to further

involvement over

price-fixing

what

arrangement."

private party is engaging

anticompetitive activity,
is acting

state

there is a

his own

is
445

in the

real danger that he

interests,

rather

than the

26.

governmental interests of the State.
not a private party,

Where the actor is

but a municipality, there is little

or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing
arrangement.
further

The only real danger is that it will seek to

purely parochial public

of more overriding state goals.

interests at the expense
This danger

is minimal,

however, because of the requirement that the municipality
act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.
it is clear
need

to

that state authorization exists,

require

the

State

to

supervise

Once

there is no
actively

the

municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated
function. 8

8

;,.~atr;s v~

rn addition to being unnecessar
equiringb
to supervise munici
conduct actively would
e unw1se.
1scons1n,
1 e many other state ,
as a tradition of
delegating broad authority to municipalities to regulate a
wide range of matters of largely local concern.
See Town
Footnote continued on next page.
----

27.

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire
in this case do not violate the Sherman Act.
taken pursuant

to a

They were

clearly articulated state policy to

replace competition in the provision of sewerage services
with

regulation.

We

further

hold

that

active

state

supervision is not a prerequisite to exemption from the
anti trust

laws where

the actor

than a private party.

is a municipality rather

We accordingly affirm the judgment

of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.

of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2d 533, 539,
314 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1982). To require active supervision
by the State would erode local autonomy and limit the
State's ability to focus on more general matters of
statewide concern.
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No. 82-1832

TOWN OF HALLIE, et al. v. CITY OF EAU CLAIRE

ON

WRIT

OF

CERTIORARI

TO

THE

UNITED

STATES

COURT

OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[December

- - ' 1984)

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This

case

presents

the

question

whether

a

municipality's anticompetitive activities are protected by

2.

the state action exemption to the federal antitrust laws
established by Parker v. Brown, 317

u.s.

341 (1943), when

the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the
State,

and

the

State

does

not

actively

supervise

the

anticompetitive conduct.
I

Petitioners--Town of Hallie,
Union,

and

Wisconsin
City

of

Town

of

townships
Eau

Claire

Town of Seymour, Town of

washington
located
(the

(the

"Towns")--are

adjacent

to

respondent,

Town

"City").

four

of

the

Hallie

is

located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are
located

in

Eau

Claire

County. 1

The

Towns

filed

suit

against the City in United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin

seeking

injunctive

relief

and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act,

15

3.

u.s.c.

§1

et

seq.,

by

acquiring

a

monopoly

over

the

provision of sewage treatment services in Eau Claire and
Chippewa
services

Counties,
to

the

transportation

and

by

provision

services. 2

Pollution Control Act, 33
had

obtained

treatment

tying

federal

facility

of

funds

of

such

collection

and

Federal

the

Water

§§1251, et seq., the City
to

the

provision

sewage

Under

u.s.c.

within

the

help

Eau

build

Claire

a

Service

sewage
Area,

which included the Towns; the facility is the only one in
the market available to the Towns.

The City has refused

to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of
the Towns

if a

majority of

the

individuals

in the area

vote by referendum election to have their homes annexed by
the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann. §§66.024(4}, 144.07(1}, and

4.

to

use

the

City's

sewage

collection

and

transportation

services.
Alleging

that

they

are

potential

competitors

of

the

City in the collection and transportation of sewage,

the

Towns contended in the District Court that the City used
its

monopoly

monopoly

over

over

sewage

the

treatment

provision

transportation services,

of

to

gain

sewage

an

unlawful

collection

and

in violation of the Sherman Act.

They also contended that the City's actions constituted an
illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal
with the Towns.
The District Court ruled for

the City.

It found that

Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of
sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace
competition

with

regulation.

The court also found

that

5.

the State adequately supervised the municipality's conduct
through the state's Department of Natural Resources, that
was

authorized

to

review

municipal

decisions

concerning

provision of sewage services and corresponding annexations
of land.

The court concluded that the City's allegedly

anticompetitive

conduct

fell

within

the

exemption to the federal antitrust laws,

state

action

as set forth in

Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455
40

(1982),

and

Parker

v.

Brown,

supra.

u.s.

Accordingly,

it

dismissed the complaint.
The

United

States

Circuit affirmed.
the

Wisconsin

Court

of

Appeals

for

700 F.2d 376 (CA7 1983).

statutes

authorized

the

the

Seventh

It ruled that

City

to

provide

sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to
unincorporated

areas.

The

court

therefore

assumed

that

6.

the

State

had

contemplated

might result.

that

anticompeti tive

effects

The City's conduct thus constituted state

action within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra.

The

court also concluded that in a case such as this involving
"a

local

government

performing

a

traditional

municipal

function," 700 F.2d, at 384, active state supervision was
unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply.
supervision as

a

prerequisite

unwise in this situation,
would
home

erode
rule

traditional
that

were

Requiring such

to immunity would also be

the court believed, because it
concepts

clearly

of

local

autonomy

expressed

in

the

u.s.

(1984),

and

state's

statutes.
We

granted

certiorari,

affirm.
II

and

now

7.

The starting point in any analysis involving the state
action doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown.
Parker,

relying

on

principles

of

federalism

and

In

state

sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act
as

applying

acting

to

the

through

Rather,

it

its

ruled

anticompetitive
317

legislature.
that

the

conduct

Sherman

u.s.,

Act was

a

State

at

350-351.

intended

prohibit private restraints on

trade,

infer

state's control over

an

intent

officers

and

legislature.

to

"nullify a

agents"

in

activities

and

of

to

it refused to

directed

by

its
the

!d., at 351.

Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on
the other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust
laws

by

virtue

themselves

of

their

sovereign.

status

City

of

because

they

Lafayette

v.

are

not

Louisiana

8.

Power

Light Co.,

&

BRENNAN,

J.).

435

u.s.

389,

to

obtain

Rather,

subdivisions must demonstrate

412

that

(1978)

(opinion of

exemption,

political

their anticompetitive

activities were authorized by the State "pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly
public

service."

Id.,

at

413.

Thus,

a

showing

by

the

municipality that its anticompetitive activities were duly
authorized

by

the

State

entitles

it

to

exemption

from

Sherman Act liability.
The

determination

constitute
inquiry:

state
the

action

State

anticompetitive

that

may

conduct

a
is

not

municipality's
not

a

purely

validate

simply

by

a

formalistic

municipality's

declaring

lawful.

Parker v.

Brown, supra, at 351.

City

Lafayette

plurality

of

activities

concluded,

it

to

be

Rather, as the
the

municipality

9.

must

establish

articulated

that

and

it

acted

pursuant

affirmatively

to

a

"clearly

expressed

state

policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State, 435

u.s.,

at

able

to

410.

The

point

authorization"

municipality

to
in

a

need

specific,

order

to

defense to an antitrust suit.

assert

not,

however,

detailed
a

legislative

successful

Id., at 415.

"be

Parker

The plurality

viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed]
to

the

States

their

freedom

to

administer

state

regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal
antitrust laws without at the same time permitting purely
parochial
goals."
In

interests

the

Nation's

free-market

Id., at 415-416.

California

Aluminum,

to disrupt

Inc.,

Retail
445

u.s.

Liquor
97

Dealers
(1980),

a

Assn.

v.

unanimous

Midcal
Court

10.

applied the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case
in

which

private

the

state

party.

immunity

for

In

there

resale

liquor

was

entitled

to

a

case,

clear

price

supervision of
wine

that

exemption

California's

though

private

action

the

wine

legislative

anticornpetitive

state

found

pricing

maintenance,

producers
the

we

was

who

set

action

claimed
no

there

was

activity.
prices

exemption.

When

a

antitrust
Even

system.

policy

resale

by

to
no

permit
state

Thus,

the

were

not

we

again

addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the
antitrust laws

in City of Boulder,

supra, we declined to

apply literally the City of Lafayette test.
Colorado's

Horne

Rule

Amendment

to

its

We held that
Constitution,

conferring on municipal governments general authority
govern

local

affairs,

did

not

constitute

a

to

"clear

11.

articulation"

of

a

policy

state

to

authorize

anticompetitive conduct with respect to the regulation of
cable

television

not meet

this

declined

to

in the

requirement of
decide

municipality

must

Because the City could

locale.

whether
also

the state action test,
governmental

satisfy

the

"active

u.s.,

455

supervision" component of the test.

action

we

by

a

state

at 51-52,

n. 14.
It

is

therefore

municipality will
state

action

clear

from

be entitled

exemption

to

our
to

the

cases
the

that

before

protection of

anti trust

laws,

it

a

the
must

demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity
pursuant
never

to

fully

a

clearly

expressed

considered,

however,

policy must be articulated for

state policy.
how

clearly

We
a

have
state

a municipality to be able

12.

to say that its anticompetitive activity constitutes state
action.

Moreover,

we

have

expressly

left

open

the

question whether action by a municipality--like action by
a

private

party--must

supervision" requirement.
52, n. 14.

satisfy

the

"active

state

City of Boulder, supra, at 51-

We consider both of those issues below.

III

The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code
to

support

its claim that

its

allegedly anticompetitive

activity constitutes state action.

We

the statutory structure in some detail.
A

therefore examine

13.

Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.18(1) grants authority to cities to
construct,
The

add

authority

reasonable

alter,

and

includes

the

particularity

the

This

Ibid.

to,

grant

§66.069(2)(c),

of

providing

repair
power

to

district

authority
that

sewerage

a

"describe

to

is

systems.

be

with

[served]."

supplemented

city operating

a

by

public

utili~y

"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service
in unincorporated areas.
Such ordinance shall
delineate the area within which service will be
provided and the municipal utility shall have no
obligation
to
serve
beyond
the
area
so
delineated."
With

respect

to

joint

sewerage

systems,

§144.07(1)

provides that the State's Department of Natural Resources
may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so
that

other

cities,

towns,

or

areas

may

connect

to

the

system, and the Department may order that such connections
be made.

Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order

14.

by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection
of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void
if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city.

3

B

The

Towns

contend

that

these

statutory provisions do

not evidence a state policy to displace competition in the
provision of sewage services because they make no express
.
of
men t 1on

.
an t'1compe t'1t1ve
con d uct.

4

As discussed above,

the statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in
anticompeti ti ve

conduct.

Such

conduct

is

a

foreseeable

result of empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed
areas.
state

It is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the
legislature

expected

the

City

to

have

to engage

anticompetitive effects.

stated

explicitly

in conduct

that

that would

it
have

Applying the analysis of City of

15.

Lafayette,

supra,

it

is

sufficient

that

the

statutes

authorized the City to provide sewage services and also to
determine the areas to be served.

We think it is clear

that anticompeti ti ve effects logically would result from
this broad authority to regulate.
Board v.

Orrin

w.

Fox Co.,

439

See New Motor Vehicle

u.s.

96,

109

(1978)

(no

express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d]
unfettered business freedom").
Turner, Antitrust Law
Nor

do we

~212.3,

agree with

the

Accord, 1 P.

Areeda

&

D.

at 54 (Supp. 1982).
Towns'

contention

that

statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy.

the
The

Towns attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home
Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing
that the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave

16.

the City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or
free-market competition in the field of sewage services.
The analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of
Boulder

is

inapposite.

That

Amendment

to

the

Colorado

Constitution allocated only the most general authority to
municipalities to govern local affairs.

We held that it

was neutral and did not satisfy the .. clear articulation ..
component of the state action test.

The Amendment simply

did not address the regulation of cable television.

Under

Home Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every
aspect of policy relating to cable television, as well as
policy relating to any other field of regulation of local
concern.

Here,

in contrast,

the

State has

specifically

authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage services and
has delegated to the cities the express authority to take

17.

action

that

effects.

foreseeably

No

will

reasonable

result

in

anticompetitive

argument can be made

that

these

statutes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home
Rule Amendment was. 5
The
pass

Towns'

the

argument

"clear

articulation"

expressly

state

that

intends

it

in a

anticompetitive
unrealistic

for

all

of

the

effects.

view

of

the

to

how

a

contention

test,

statute or

statutes are written.
catalog

amounts

a

legislature

to

must

its legislative history

delegated
This

that

action

contention

legislatures

to

embodies

work

and

of

have
an
how

No legislature can be expected to

anticipated effects of

a

statute of

this kind.
Furthermore,

requiring

the State would be unwise.

such explicit authorization by
Justice Stewart's dissent in

18.

City

of

Lafayette

opinion

would

was

impose

municipalities'

this

local

435

that

kind

detrimental

with

legislatures,

themselves.

concerned

autonomy

u.s.,

and

the

plurality's

of

requirement

side

effects

authority

at 434-435.

to

on
upon

govern

This Court has never

required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist
is necessary. 6
In

sum,

evidence
expressed..

we
a

conclude

.. clearly
state

policy

that

the

Wisconsin

articulated
to

affirmatively

and

displace

statutes

competition

with

regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage
services.
.. 'the

These

statutory provisions

legislature

complained

of. ' ..

contemplated
City

of

plainly

the

Lafayette,

kind

show
of

supra,

(quoting the deicison of the court of appeals,

that

action
at

415

532 F.2d

19.

431, 434

(CAS 1976)).

7

This is sufficient to satisfy the

clear articulation requirement of the state action test.

c
The Towns further
requirement of

the

argue that the
state

action

that the City show that the State
In so doing,

11

test
11

Clear articulation ..
requires

at

least

compelled 11 it to act.

they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit

Edison Co., 428

u.s.

579 {1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia

State

u.s.

773

Bar,

421

contention

for

concerned

several

private

(1975).
reasons.

parties--not

the state action exemption.

We disagree with
Cantor

and

Goldfarb

municipalities--claiming

This fact distinguishes those

cases because a municipality is an arm of the State.
may presume,

absent a

showing to the contrary,

municipality

acts

the

in

this

public

interest.

A

We

that the
private

20.

party,

on

the other

primarily on his or
concluded

hand,

in another

case decided

a private party

compulsion where

be presumed

today,

as we have

Southern Motor

u.s.

Inc. v. United States,

is not

the

to be acting

Also,

its own behalf.

Carriers Rate Conference,

__,

may

invariably required to show

state authorization or

approval

is

clear.
None

of

our

cases

involving

the

application

of

the

state action exemption to a municipality has required that
compulsion

u.s.,

be

of

Boulder,

supra,

at 56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435

416-417,

spoke

authorization
This

Both City

shown.

is

acting

so

of

in
the

because

pursuant

terms

to

of

the

State's

anticompetitive
where
a

the

clearly

actor

direction

practice
is

a

articulated

u.s.,

at

455
at
or

issue.

municipality,
state

policy,

21.

compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary matter
to prove

that

the challenged practice constitutes

action.

In

expressed

is good evidence of state policy,

means

a

short,

although

prerequisite

to

a

compulsion

finding

that

state

affirmatively

a

it is by no
municipality

acted pursuant to clearly articulated state policy.

IV
Finally,

the Towns argue

state supervision,
action exemption.

The Towns rely primarily on language in
It is fair to say that our cases have

not been entirely clear.
did

there was no active

the City may not depend on the state

City of Lafayette.

Lafayette

that as

say,

The plurality opinion in City of

without

elaboration,

that

a

city

claiming the exemption must show that its anticompetitive
conduct was actively supervised by the State.

435

u.s.,

22.

at

410.

In

California

Midcal

Aluminum,

Court

held

Inc.,

that

Retail

Liquor

u.s.

445

supervision

97

Dealers

(1980),

is

a

however,

the

most

required

recent

v.

unanimous
where

anticompetitive conduct is by private parties.
Boulder,

Assn.

the

In City of

relevant

case,

we

expressly left this issue open as to municipalities.

We

now conclude that the active state supervision requirement
should

not

be

imposed

in cases

in which

the actor

is a

municipality.
As

with

respect

to

the

compulsion argument discussed

above, see supra, at ___, the requirement of active state
supervision
it
the

serves

essentially

an

evidentiary

is one way of ensuring that the actor
challenged

Midcal,

we

conduct

stated

that

pursuant
the

to

active

function:

is engaging in

State
state

policy.

In

supervision

23.

requirement

was

necessary

to

prevent

a

State

from

circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by casting
gauzy

a

essentially

u.s.,

a

at 106.

cloak of state
private

price-fixing

arrangement."

is
445

Where a private party is engaging in the

anticompetitive activity,
is acting

involvement over what

to further

there is a real danger that he

his own interests,

governmental interests of the State.

rather

than the

Where the actor is

not a private party, but a municipality, there is little
or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing
arrangement.
further

The only real danger is that it will seek to

purely parochial public interests at the expense

of more overriding state goals.

This danger is minimal,

however, because of the requirement that the municipality
act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.

Once

24.

it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no
need

to

require

the

State

to

supervise

actively

the

municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated
function. 8

v
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire
in this case do not violate the Sherman Act.

They were

taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to
replace competition in the provision of sewerage services
with

regulation.

We

further

hold

that

active

state

supervision is not a prerequisite to exemption from the
anti trust laws where the actor is a municipality rather
than a private party.

We accordingly affirm the judgment

of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.

